Daily Report

Supplement

Soviet Union

NATIONAL AFFAIRS
CPSU Central Committee Plenum

FBIS-SOV-91-148-S
Thursday
1 August 1991

Soviet Union

SUPPLEMENT

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

CPSU Central Committee Plenum

FBIS-SOV-91-148-S *1 August 1991*

CONTENTS

NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM

25 July Speeches

Ilin Says Draft Program Weak on Marxist Theory *[PRAVDA 27 Jul]* 1
Academician Marchuk on Role of Science *[PRAVDA 29 Jul]* 3
Variant Report of Prokofyev Speech *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 27 Jul]* 4
Economics Institute's Abalkin on Draft Program *[PRAVDA 29 Jul]* 6
Tashkent's Abdullayev Favors Program *[PRAVDA 27 Jul]* 7
Kazakh Party's Anufriyev Says Draft 'Eroded' *[PRAVDA 27 Jul]* 9
Turkmen Academy's Babayev: Draft 'Base' for Work *[PRAVDA 29 Jul]* 10
Control Commission's Chuykov: Draft 'Worrying' *[PRAVDA 27 Jul]* 12
Variant Report of Gidaspov Speech *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 27 Jul]* 13
Ukraine's Kharchenko: Unity Needed *[PRAVDA 29 Jul]* 15
Tajikistan's Makhkamov: Draft Creates Opportunity *[PRAVDA 27 Jul]* 17
Moscow Worker Nikolayev: No Guarantee in Draft *[PRAVDA 29 Jul]* 18
Tomsk's Pomorov: Action Needed 'Today' *[PRAVDA 29 Jul]* 19
Novgorod's Proskurin: Draft Requires Work *[PRAVDA 27 Jul]* 21
Moldova's Yeremy: Draft Reflects Tasks *[PRAVDA 27 Jul]* 22

26 July Speeches

PRAVDA Version of Latsis Speech *[29 Jul]* 24
PRAVDA Version of Lukyanov Speech *[29 Jul]* 26
Economics Institute's Martynov Supports Draft *[PRAVDA 29 Jul]* 27

25 July Speeches

Ilin Says Draft Program Weak on Marxist Theory

PM2807125191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
27 Jul 91 Second Edition p 4

["Account" of speech delivered by A.N. Ilin, second secretary of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee, at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on 25 July]

[Text] The draft submitted by the working group takes into account many of the remarks made during the discussion of previous versions. Some of the ideas in it will certainly be supported not just by party members but also by the majority of Soviet people. What I primarily mean are the provisions for extricating the country from the crisis and establishing civic peace and accord. Our paramount duty now is probably to organize a broad study of this draft in primary organizations and party committees at all levels, as well as qualitative additional work on it involving our party's entire intellectual potential. At the same time, when determining our attitude toward the draft under discussion, I think that we all are well aware of the lofty responsibility before the party being taken on by the Central Committee and the commission set up by the 28th congress. Life itself confirms the correctness of Lenin's idea that without a program the party cannot exist as an integral political organism capable of always adhering to its line, at each and every turn of events. There can be no doubt that the quality of the draft that has been published and its contents will either promote the consolidation of Communists or push them toward a split which is in any event looming as an increasingly real danger.

Unfortunately, the draft's authors have not succeeded in implementing a series of constructive ideas. Furthermore, their desire for brevity has resulted in the loss of certain important provisions of a fundamental nature, which determine the party's image as a Communist Party. Attention is primarily drawn to the fact that the ideas about the need to restore and develop the fundamental principles of the teaching of Marx, Engels, and Lenin as the base of the contemporary concept of socialism and the CPSU's policy have groundlessly disappeared from the text. Moreover, the authors rank different concepts from our own and the world's Communist thinking on par with Marxism as sources of contemporary socialist theory. We can only guess about the specific concepts in question. The party program must not contain hints and ambiguities. We are bound to proceed from the uncontestable stipulation that this document can be built only on a strictly scientific foundation and is the party's official theory.

Materialistic dialectics—the living soul of Marxism—does not accept the mechanical admixture of different and at times mutually exclusive world outlook tenets. In our view, this approach has prevented the authors from offering an objective analysis of the path traversed by the Soviet people under the Communist Party's leadership in the last 70 years. The description of the post-October period as a whole suffers from oversimplification, confusion in the appraisal of objective and subjective factors governing the development of collaboration between base and superstructure and of the role of individuals and the masses in history, and many other shortcomings. The fact that the draft examines this period in detachment from the world's general civilizing process cannot be accepted as normal. The authors have failed to determine the socioeconomic formation to which we belong and what sort of society has been built in the country. Leonid Ivanovich Khitrun spoke about this, and I want to pursue this point. The essence is hardly reflected by descriptions used in the draft, like "totalitarian system," "authoritarian bureaucratic regime," "totalitarian dictatorship," and other suchlike. It is impossible to understand what prompted the authors to exclude from this document the tenet, contained in earlier versions, that the real practice of socialism not only maintains and builds up its creative potential in today's conditions, but also has a substantial effect on the evolution of capitalism. Incidentally, this was aptly put, in my opinion, by Nikolay Ivanovich Shlyaga at the Program Commission's last sitting. It is our profound belief that the program must accurately formulate the real process, must not say even a single word to contradict the orientation of socioeconomic evolution, and must proceed from absolutely accurately established facts. Without this, without a revelation of the internal contradictions inherent in our society today, it is impossible to learn correct lessons for the future and offer a scientific substantiation of the need for perestroyka, of its immediate tasks and objectives, of the ways to achieve them. For example, I believe that the program must reflect the contradictions between labor and the newly-emerging capital, which are something new for us. Today these selfsame contradictions are already taking the form of impoverishment of the bulk of the population, prosperity for shadow economy dealers, and numerous conflicts in society. Attempts to resolve them legislatively to capital's advantage generate natural resistance among working people and a buildup of the people's anger, fraught with a social explosion.

It is impossible to overlook a fundamental aspect like the disappearance from the draft of the stipulation about the leading role of public forms of ownership and the appearance therein of a flowery thesis about the party's unprejudiced attitude toward the activity of new strata of society, emerging in the sphere of private enterprise.

And it is altogether and totally impermissible that the draft's authors have to all intents and purposes abandoned the working people's social gains, primarily the rights to work, rest, and be housed which are guaranteed by the USSR Constitution.

I would like to make a special point about democracy. The essence of this process is extremely confused in the draft. Even though the term itself is used on about 200 occasions.

On the one hand, the authors speak of the system of soviets. On the other hand, they seem to overlook the gigantic offensive which has been launched along the path of eliminating the soviet form of democracy. At least in our republic, the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], matters are already progressing toward the establishment of a new regime, based on personal dictatorship, beneath the camouflage of the need to step up executive power. Look at the RSFSR president's decree on political parties and mass social movements. It is a graphic example of the exercise of power which relies directly on violence [nasiliye] and is not associated [ne svyazannaya] with any laws. Let us make it clear what sort of democracy we are talking about.

Look at the situation in Georgia and the Baltic republics. What do you think, is it developing in a perfectly democratic spirit? In this context, I would like to right away address the Presidium and ask Mikhail Sergeyevich to clarify one of the report's stipulations.

I got the impression that Mikhail Sergeyevich uttered a sentence to the effect that party organizations must work with labor collectives but not within labor collectives. Let me explain where doubts arise. We recently endured a major onslaught at a press conference. The following question was asked: What will the Russian Communist Party do if Mikhail Sergeyevich backs up this decree? We replied that Mikhail Sergeyevich is president of the USSR and he swore on oath on the USSR Constitution. And we think that he will never back up this decree because for him the main commandment is to protect the observance of our Fundamental Law like the apple of his eye. Therefore, if this is to happen at labor collectives it means that we are giving in once more, and if we are giving in, this will lead to calamity. Let us, therefore, stop talking about building a rule-of-law state, because words are already diverging from deeds.

Incidentally, we must nonetheless make it clear that the question of power is a key question also for our party. Therefore, if we want our program to be well received by the workers, peasants, and other strata of the working people, we all must admit that when we transferred power to the soviets, due to defects in the electoral system, we transferred power to soviets without workers', peasants', and soldiers' deputies. Therefore the task facing us all is to admit this mistake, tell the people the whole truth, and tell them how we intend to correct this mistake. It is shameful that we, unfortunately, failed to preserve this Leninist tradition. During the very first years of Soviet power, workers' deputies accounted for more than 50 percent of deputies on city soviets. And this is why nowadays we fail at times to gain support among the workers movement.

And another point. Russia's Communists are firmly in favor of the CPSU's self-renewal. It seems to me, however, that the draft's authors got confused over two ideas: Are they tackling the CPSU's renewal or are they elaborating a program for a new party. Let us try and work this one out today. If it is a matter of renewal, it is necessary to seek out and preserve the fundamental stipulations without casting overboard everything that the party has accumulated over the years. But if we are building a new party, this must be stated honestly and openly. In any event, the theoretical basis is already giving rise to doubts: The reliance on the working class, the peasantry, and on youth and other public organizations already appears in a different form. But this is not all. I am getting the impression that we are quietly and unnoticeably introducing the principle of federalization into the party. The question immediately arises: How will the CPSU and the Central Committee function then? If we are to introduce this principle in our party building, it would be proper to consult the Communists.

To continue. The document shows traces of a combination of two terms: democracy and anarchy. If we are talking about democracy, then we must understand and accurately define responsibilities, because if this is lacking we will gradually switch to the second term.

This is the danger right now, because the party is losing its ideological and organizational unity and—let us be frank about it—some platforms and streams are now making attempts at creating their own factions and what is taking shape is, to all intents and purposes, a revisionist and rightwing-opportunist wing—the time has come to use this term.

A frankly splittist and liquidationist activity is pursued by the so-called movement "Communists for Democracy." It is amazing, they reject socialism, they reject communism, and yet claim the right to represent the CPSU on Russia's territory. Having only just criticized the state party, they immediately declare that we will be a party which will ensure normal work by Russia's first president. Who is against that? What we are against is the creation of a new state party. I think that today we must make a perfectly clear appraisal of this.

Many ideas have certainly been expressed about the draft. In all probability, the working group simply did not have enough time to sum up the past discussion, and I hope that this time the voice of Central Committee members and all who are taking part in this conversation will be taken into account before submitting the draft to a broad discussion. I think that the further work on the draft must be assigned to the commission elected by the 28th congress and that it should be published in the press in its name.

And finally, two conclusions which were voiced yesterday at the commission on primary organizations' problems.

First, Mikhail Sergeyevich correctly addressed remarks at the party press today. But, dear comrades, we all agreed at a plenum a long time ago that we should hear a report either from the CPSU Central Committee on the leadership of mass media, or from PRAVDA's editor. It is incomprehensible why our leadership is so careless in complying with what we decide here, at plenums. If Petr

Kirillovich [Luchinskiy], being a relative newcomer (he has not been in charge of this sector for very long), is not ready to report, this could be done by the Ideological Problems Commission.

It must be borne in mind that the rayon and oblast party press is being essentially stifled. Our Russian Minister Poltoranin has been sending one circular after another in this direction. I for one cannot understand why our scant material, technical, and printing base has been handed over to KURANTY, ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, and OGONEK, and how long is this likely to last? The plenum must re-examine priorities.

Concluding his speech, the speaker suggested that the activity of the commission which investigated the state of affairs in Estonia be appraised as unsatisfactory, noting that this question cannot be allowed to drag on: It is impossible to remain indifferent to the voice of Communists from the fraternal republic.

Academician Marchuk on Role of Science

PM3007088191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jul 91 Second Edition p 5

["Account" of speech delivered by G.I. Marchuk, president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on 25 July]

[Text] Today many people have spoken about science and the scientific approach. I see this as evidence of an awareness that scientific research can determine the only correct direction of movement for a society making its way from one structure to another. I would like to support the speeches of my colleagues who spoke about the general problems of the Communist Party, about development, about the Program. I believe that the draft already, on the whole, reflects a synthesis of the opinion of those present, and despite the fact that each one has his own view of many things, in the course of today we have managed to find a nucleus, a core that can be further worked on and then submitted to the party and people. Naturally, therefore, we are all concerned about the party's fate and its correct development in society's interests. I think that all the valuable proposals put forward at the Plenum will be integrated and taken into account in the course of the finalization of the Program.

I will only speak about how the Program reflects the role of science itself.

The USSR Academy of Sciences and the union republics' Academies of Sciences see it as their main task to develop a mechanism and scientific concepts of a kind really to help society—and that includes the party—in its development.

Our perestroyka is a revolution, comrades, and revolutions are not easy. Because we are making the transition to a new level of development in our society, which is undergoing renewal; the transition to a new structure for our party and its role in our state. And I think few people can now be confident that it is possible accurately to predict in advance which is the most correct path for the transition. We must therefore make use of the groundwork offered by world science and our own Soviet science, and develop it actively.

The draft Program states that the whole of world civilization is now at a crossroads. For us, the choice of a new path to civilization has coincided with our own crisis, the loss of pace in scientific and technical progress. This has made the equilibrium particularly unstable, and science bears an unprecedented responsibility, while at the same time its very existence as a large, independent system is under threat.

The state of society now is such that it hardly pays any attention to science, particularly fundamental science. Now, as we discuss the new Program, we must recognize that fact.

Our Program rightly defines as a priority the social funding that the party should seek to obtain for fundamental science and education, as well as culture and art. Despite the resources appropriated from the budget—and resources have been appropriated to us at last year's level—we are at a critical point as regards providing for science, as a consequence of progressive inflation.

In the past three decades the Academy of Sciences has suffered some major, unjustified acts in connection with the removal from its jurisdiction of some 100 scientific institutions in the applied fields, such as computer technology, machine building, power engineering, chemical technology, and others. It must be added that VUZ [higher educational institutions] science has been bled dry, along with applied science, which is now torn between rapidly changing economic structures. As a result we find a very serious weakening of contacts between fundamental and applied science. All this should be covered in the Program, and it is covered, to a great extent, in the draft. In this sense the USSR President's Decree "On the New Status of the USSR Academy of Sciences" is a major event, enabling scientists themselves to determine the avenues of scientific research and priorities and offering the opportunity to realize the principles of self-development for science and its organizational forms. At the same time, of course, this laid on the academy an enormous responsibility for the state of fundamental research in the country and for providing the scientific groundwork for applied research. But since certain resolutions envisaged in the decree have yet to be adopted and the Russian Supreme Soviet has suspended the validity of the point covering the academy's property, the realization of the wide potential offered has yet to be implemented in full. We are hoping for a speedy agreement and resolution of these questions.

We are currently preparing for a general meeting of the USSR Academy of Sciences, at which the state of affairs regarding two extremely important problems—economics and philosophy—will be discussed. It has

already been said here, quite rightly, that dogmatism and subjectivism have caused us to lose scientists, lose them tragically, lose them through lack of respect for those sciences. Now that the time has come and the "golden age," so to speak, is upon us for these sciences, we find ourselves powerless to make a substantial contribution to their development. The Academy of Sciences general meeting, which we are planning for October, should now reinterpret the structure and propositions that have become established in economics, history, and other social spheres.

Science is a stabilizing, integrating factor for the formation of the Union. In recent years, when crisis processes have had particularly alarming consequences for science, the USSR Academy of Sciences and the union republics' Academies of Sciences have set up a council of presidents—of the USSR Academy of Sciences and of the Academies of Sciences of all 15 union republics. A powerful integrating factor has appeared in our life, which, by coordinating science, acts as an additional structure of stabilization for the Union.

The Russian Academy of Sciences is currently in the process of being formed. We believe this will strengthen the country's scientific potential.

An important task for us is to stop the brain drain, which is steadily increasing. To this end it is necessary to create the conditions to ensure the retooling of science, especially its stock of instruments. It is necessary to create the minimum necessary conditions of social protection for scientists, who, by virtue of the nature of their research, have no additional sources of income.

I think the Communist Party should defend the close links that have formed in international policy, boost the prestige of the scientist, and uphold guarantees of social protection. After all, this too is a manifestation of the new thinking. The draft Program links internal and external problems. This question must become genuinely the central question with which the Academy of Sciences concerns itself, and we are prepared to take that on.

It is important to note that among the party's policy goals, the Program mentions priority support for fundamental and applied research. Here the main attention is devoted to problems of economics, information science, ecology and the rational utilization of resources, and problems of culture and education. Of course, the party is in the process of renewal and transition to a new situation. The version of the Program that has been submitted orients the CPSU toward strengthening its inner forces and increasing the unity of its ranks. All this should be supported, and after discussion at the present Plenum we should move on to the adoption of this Program.

Variant Report of Prokofyev Speech

PM3007114191 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 27 Jul 91 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed report under the rubric "At the CPSU Central Committee Plenum": "Speech by Yu.A. Prokofyev," first secretary of Moscow City CPSU Committee, delivered at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on 25 July]

[Text] The Moscow City Party Committee Secretariat has carefully considered the proposed draft CPSU program and thinks that it is absolutely essential to publish the document in our party press. How to assess this draft is another matter. There is a certain complication for me here, because I was a member of the Commission for the Preparation of the Draft Program. But I think that today it is not a matter of appearing in a good light. It is a question of our party's fate. The only thing required of us is honesty to ourselves and to all Communists. The proposed draft program was neither a document giving a new vision of the party's theoretical basis nor a program for its actions. It declares, and declares for the nineties, fine intentions. I will recall some of them. The structural perestroyka of the economy on the basis of high technology, state aid to the countryside, and the protection of socially vulnerable sections of the population. And a guarantee of free treatment and education for all citizens, and even an increase in the proportion of national income channeled into basic scientific research, education, and culture. But to what extent are they realistic? It is bad enough that all these intentions have not been extrapolated in relation to the country's crisis situation, no priorities have been set out, and the phasing for completing extremely capital-intensive tasks has not been determined.

In addition, the party which is announcing such purposeful intentions is in effect not a ruling party. It should have been all the more necessary to indicate the mechanism for their implementation. Unfortunately, the document makes no mention of such a mechanism.

And what about the draft program's de facto backing for private ownership of land and privatization of housing? (True enough, subsidies for the mainetnance of housing are promised for the socially vulnerable population strata. But is this enough?) I would not wish to dwell any longer on specific comments on the text. They will be handed to the working group. It is more important to note something else.

I am forced to recognize the split [razdvoyeniye] of political awareness and the loss of the sense of reality on the part of the authors of the document submitted to us. And this is not just my own opinion. The draft's publication in advance of the plenum has made it possible to find out the initial reaction to it. The reaction by people who today stand in real-life lines, receive treatment in real-life polyclinics, send their children to real-life young pioneer camps at sky-high prices, man real-life obsolete

machine tools, and receive real-life state wages. Their reaction is one of perplexity and disappointment.

Dichotomy, alienation, and the inhabiting of a world remote from reality characterize not only this program but also the whole situation that has developed in our party life. To identify the sources of this disease and determine the methods to treat it—this should be our paramount task if we intend to exist as a political organization upholding the interests of working people.

The reasons are already obvious now. The perestroyka project, implemented starting mid-1987, is a "revolution from above" carried out by a narrow circle, the highest party nomenklatura, which was partly initiated into the project, and a liberal scientific elite that knows the essence of the scheme. A number of them have already left the party, saddling those who have remained with responsibility for the consequences of their policy. This essence is now quite obvious to everyone. This alliance also brought with it a new ideology—the ideology of the "sixties liberals" which is correct in everything that concerned criticism of our society's illness. But a woolly, wishy-washy, in many respects unconstructive ideology regarding the aims of social development and the ways of getting out of the deadlock. Consequently there is a profound system crisis.

And here is what concerns me most of all. The deeper the crisis becomes, the greater the extent that the worst qualities of the past are displayed—voluntarism, new ideological tunnel vision, one-track thinking, and the curbing of democratic processes in the party. As a Politburo member I am not absolving myself of responsibility for the situation that has developed. Assembling irregularly, without considering many vitally important questions, the Politburo was in many respects a formal organ. Instead of uniting, we all started acting on our own responsibility in our own party organizations, thereby aggravating the disintegration of the CPSU as a united whole. What do I see as the way out of the situation that has developed? Letting democratic processes be implemented not in words but in deeds.

The main component of this process is well known to us. It is criticism from the party's grass roots and the ability to accept this criticism above without pride, the ability to learn to blame oneself, and the ability to acknowledge mistakes, to take them profoundly to heart and make amends, rebuilding oneself in the process. And not to look on anyone who does not agree with you as an "enemy of perestroyka."

Incidentally, it is time to clarify this term. In fact, the struggle is not between the opponents of change and its supporters, but between those who have different visions of the nature of our society's reformation, the social basis of reforms, and their aims and methods of implementing them. In accordance with this we have a complex arrangement of political forces, so complex that society has become confused and has difficulty understanding who is who. It would seem that the task of the CPSU program is to clarify the question regarding the arrangement of political forces. But this key question in the program is not being considered at all. Its authors seem not to notice that in today's heat of passion all the basic principles and concepts existing in world practice are being adulterated. Democracy and conservatism are being contrasted. Here the well-known slogan "He who is not with us is a conservative" is being professed. But this is not the main point, rather it is that such contrasting does not withstand criticism theoretically. It is populism of the first water, not to mention political ignorance. The antipode of conservatism is not democracy but radicalism. And the antipode of democracy is not conservatism but authoritarianism.

The CPSU is campaigning for the path of gradual reforms. This is the only respect in which it is conservative, and there is nothing bad about that because it is a norm of present-day political life for all civilized countries, which stems from the situation in the late 20th century, when drastic radical breaks are intolerable, when the intolerability of a break with society's cultural and spiritual traditions and values has become a political axiom. At the same time, the bulk of the CPSU's party organizations, including Moscow's, are advocating multipartyism, general representation of the people in soviets, and uncompensated privatization in the interests of the people and not of a narrow group of entrepreneurs and not in the interests of the new nomenklatura. That means that in the three key questions of society's political organization, representation of the people, and ownership they are making demands of the most democratic nature according to all world standards. We will see what demands our opponents will make regarding the same questions. They support a radical break and severing traditions. In this respect they are radicals. And in the West, by the way, among other things they have long been called "extremists."

As regards the three remaining questions, as we were able to see for ourselves from the president of Russia's latest decisions and programs, including his decree on departyization, and also from the actions of the mayors of Moscow and Leningrad, we are talking about infringing the rights of political parties and organizations and the rights of the workers, about curtailing representation of the people and the institution of democracy, and, finally, about elite privatization.

What is the conclusion? It is that we are dealing with authoritarian radicalism on the one hand and democratic conservatism on the other. This is a sound description of the actual arrangement of political forces. Without demagoguery or populism. But as I have already said, the program says nothing of the sort. Incidentally, there is nothing of the sort to be found in the pages of our central party press, either.

We exist in a situation of acute political struggle. It has been imposed upon us by our opponents and is often waged with violation of all civlized rules. In this situation the question of the party organization's connection

with party literature is becoming one of the most important questions. Let us see how our "party literature" is behaving.

In front of me are two newspapers which have commented on the decree on departyization. Let us compare just the headlines. Here are the headlines from NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA. On the first page in boldface: "CPSU Central Committee Plenum." "Conservatives Prepare for Attack." "New CPSU Draft Program." "Can Gorbachev Stay in CPSU Much Longer?" "Yeltsin Brings Gorbachev Present on Eve of CPSU Central Committee Plenum." "New Communists Choose Democracy." "'Movement for Democratic Reform' Gets Stronger." "Aliyev's Statement on Leaving Communist Party."

Now we open PRAVDA of the same date. And we read: "Penelope Sets Sail." "Where the 'Blue Birds' Have Gone." "They Are Not in the Field." "Height of Summer on Top of World." And at the side: "Who Are the 'Departyizers' Fighting?" What is that? Is that the way to conduct political struggle in extreme conditions? Or is it something else? I think it is bankruptcy, the deliberate diversion of Communists from pressing problems, and the complete inability to analyze and predict the situation. And the direct path to the disintegration of the party organization via the disintegration of party literature.

Now about the party itself and how it has been represented in the draft. Membership has been eroded, the division of the party along national lines is well known. The results have been preprogrammed: The party will disappear as a key political structure. This will deprive society of the paths of reform which can resolve urgent tasks in the shortest possible time and with the least pain. That aside, the following question remains: Why did Yugoslavia, with its relationship to the party and with its types of reforms, fail, while China is carrying out reform successfully? There is food for thought here. The nature of the future CPSU and the nature of reforms in our society, their pace, and their quality are interdependent.

In conclusion I want to say that, at the same time as this draft program is published, it is necessary to begin a general party debate on the program questions so as to have the opportunity to compare all versions of the program that were proposed by all party theoreticians and all party members interested in the CPSU's fate, and not only those proposed by the highest scientific party nomenklatura. In short, the democratization of our party must be carried out not in words but in deeds. It is necessary to make questions of theory accessible to all, primarily to young people who are capable of creative thinking. We support the proposal contained in the report on holding the 29th congress in November-December 1991. This coincides with the opinion of the Moscow CPSU City Committee. We can fix the date of 10 November, for example, and adopt it at our plenum.

As regards the criticism leveled in the Politburo yesterday at our plenum, its materials have been published in full. And everyone can draw his own conclusions.

I will stress again that the people who now want a return to the old times are a negligible minority in our party. We can discuss the question of their CPSU membership and, I think, we must do so. But the majority are demanding the truth; they are demanding constructive real aims, sound programs, and a considered movement forward in the interests of the people. And there is nothing notoriously reactionary about that, there is only the sincere desire to help the country get out of the deadlock.

Economics Institute's Abalkin on Draft Program

PM2907134391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jul 91 Second Edition p 3

["Account" of speech delivered by L.I. Abalkin, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Economics Institute, at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on 25 July]

[Text] It is very important, the speaker said, first and foremost to establish the criteria we are going to use in assessing the draft Program that has been presented. I think the draft must first be examined for the extent to which it reflects the objective logic of social development—and not only in our country, but also world trends of socioeconomic progress. To what extent it is based on a modern understanding of problems or reflects long-obsolete notions and in many ways mythical views of society. I think that if we approach it from this position, we can say that the draft is a step forward compared with existing documents.

At the same time, on reading the documents one is left with a considerable feeling of dissatisfaction. In the first place, it is scarcely necessary to combine in a single document a program proclaiming the party's goals and the principles of its activity and work methods and a program of practical action. As for the program of practical action, it needs to be even more specific and even closer to reality in view of the upcoming fall and the winter following it. We do not appreciate fully as yet the scale of the social and economic dangers that lie in wait in the next six months, unless we adopt extraordinary, emergency measures.

The fact that on many matters the program does not give a clear theoretical answer to the processes that are taking place and occasionally even avoids them is also unsatisfactory. The idea is perhaps to avoid causing excessive emotion and itensifying the processes that carry the threat of disintegration. Nonetheless there has to be clarity.

In this connection I want to dwell on some fundamental questions, stressing at the outset that we have gotten badly carried away with current events and our attention has strayed from the basic, fundamental theoretical

thesis on which the party was built, on which it can continue to be built in the future.

First of all, in what sense is it the party of the working class? Not in the sense of protecting its interests. This was formulated at the very outset, when the party was first created. There are trade unions to protect the working class' economic interests. Just as there are to protect the economic interests of all other strata.

The concept of Marxism originally developed from an entirely different concept. It was the teaching and party of social progress, geared to actual social progress and placing the goals of social progress above all else. Only in the sense that the interests of the working class coincided with the interests of social progress and were identified with the interests of the majority of society was this party the party of the working class. Only in that sense.

So even now we must place at the top of the agenda an understanding of the changes taking place in society. What is progress? Who is the vehicle for progress? What forms of organization of economic, political, and spiritual life bring about this progress? If we acknowledge this, then we have to defend the methods of attaining the goals of social progress, while serving the interests of the majority of human society, whatever these methods may be called—plan, market, or whatever.

It has to be said that the changes that have occurred since the teaching came into being have made many significant adjustments to the concept of social progress. Obviously we must not look for extenuating cirumstance here, but the teaching came into being in the industrial era. It reflected many of the values and patterns of that period of time. Hence the unequivocal assessment or identification of progress with the progress of the productive forces. Hence the rigid technological dependence of social changes. Now we see that there are higher values—social, moral, and spiritual. They reflect the patterns of social development as they are understood at present.

In this connection, L.I. Abalkin stressed, we must also define our ideal. Need one talk about this? Of course, the lessons of history are not without consequences, and the repeated attempts to paint a picture of a bright future have been an inhibiting factor in the statement of these tasks. It seems to me that the party can gain authority and become an organizing and unifying force if it is capable of uniting society and the masses around an ennobling idea.

We want to create a society which will have a highly efficient economy that is flexible and receptive to scientific-technical achievements and addresses human beings and their social needs and requirements. We want to have the kind of society we would like to live in, so that, if we go away, we will want to come back again after a time. We want a society which will inspire a sense of pride in all who live in it and respect in those who look on. We cannot aim for less.

What to call it is a difficult question. But the attempt to describe all phenomena in the two concepts capitalism and socialism, which was permissible 100 years ago, is unsuitable now and fails to reflect the real changes that have taken place in the world. It all requires thorough study, and perhaps we are not ready at the moment to finally formulate all this in the party's programmatic document. But we must do so by the time it is adopted.

There is something else I would like to say. There is a serious defect in our ideas, in our traditional way of thinking. It has also been reflected in the programmatic document under discussion. We have gotten used to blaming the external environment, meaning the social system, the state setup or the activities of the managerial apparatus, for all the problems, including people's living conditions.

That is a very convenient ideology because it relieves people of the reponsibilities they have. They are able to blame the system for their personal failures and for all the inconveniences of life. There are various names for the system: It used to be called autocracy, and people struggled against it and blamed it for everything; now we talk about the evils of the administrative command system, but everyone feels he is a victim and not the cause of what has happenbed.

It is a very complex problem—moral and philosophical—concerning everyone's personal responsibility. And when we describe history we also must not blame everything on the system. We must clearly explain and tell people the unvarnished truth, albeit unpleasant, that they, and not just the system, are to blame for much of it. And try as we might to restructure the system, without moral improvement, without hard work, without the desire and aspiration to increase our well-being and achieve success, without all this we will not change the world. We also need to clearly state the task of shaping both a spiritual culture and a new economic culture by urging people to do this, not by merely flirting with them.

Although this document is incomplete, I am in favor of publishing it and launching an all-party debate. Of getting those who are capable of enriching the Program with modern ideas involved in the finalization of it, so that, in accordance with the congress results, we can adopt a document that we can be proud of.

Tashkent's Abdullayev Favors Program

PM2907101591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Jul 91 Second Edition p 4

["Account" of speech delivered by D.A. Abdullayev, rector of the Tashkent Electrotechnical Communications Institute, at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on 25 July]

[Text] In his recent conversation on the first channel of All-Union Television, Vladimir Antonovich Ivashko stated that the draft program submitted to the CPSU

Central Committee Plenum is the eighth version of the document. In this connection I was reminded of the case of the draft CPSU Statutes, when millions of Communists discussed one version for six months, and a week before the beginning of the 28th Congress, a different one was handed to their delegates, in which many of the Communists' proposals were not sufficiently well reflected. Let the same thing not happen this time.

Personally I will vote for taking the present draft as the basis for the party program. Because this may be our last chance to consolidate our ranks and prevent a decisive split in the CPSU.

Do the Communists of Uzbekistan want consolidation, social peace, and the integrity of the CPSU? Undoubtedly they do, and they will strive to the last for such a development of events. But that does not mean that we are prepared for any hasty correction of the CPSU program or statutes. That is why I would like to express my vision of the problem as regards various positions, and my opinion on individual principles.

Take the theoretical pivot of the program. What does it look like? Until recently we based ourselves on the fundamental teaching of the classic writers of Marxism-Leninism. But what teaching lies at the basis of the draft program? It is simply not obvious, although there seem to be words about socialism and communism everywhere.

Second. I personally feel very confused about three theses contained in the draft: on the freedom of every party member to be a believer or to adhere to atheistic convictions; on the right to participate or not in the work of one of the CPSU organizations; and to decide for oneself whether to give material assistance to the party or not. If the comrades can remember this, the last two theses were burning issues at the Second Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers Party. So what is this, a return to the unfinished argument between Lenin and Martov? After all, it is clear to any sensible Communist that the opportunity of working or not working in one of the party's organizations and paying or not paying dues conceals within it a desire to break up the CPSU's unity and structure, and place another delayed-action mine under it. That is why I cannot agree with certain provisions in M.S. Gorbachev's speech.

Another thesis—the one on believers and atheists—is perhaps not so terrible, given the enthusiasm for religion that is so fashionable today. But does it comply with the cornerstone of Marxist teaching—materialism? No, it does not.

Third. Analyzing version after version, the Uzbek Communist Party in the shape of its Central Committee, as I am aware, has twice pointed out one important circumstance, namely the absence, in the second section of the draft program, of answers to the following questions: Why have the world socialist system and the Warsaw Pact fallen apart and where are the roots and what are the consequences of the structural split of the CPSU in the Baltic and Transcaucasus republics? After all, are these things so trifling that you can keep silent about them and not say a single word about them? And is this not a lesson of history, and consequently a subject for theoretical interpretation?

Fourth. I am still not satisfied by the structure, the structural composition of the draft that has been submitted. As rector of an institute and someone who comes up against the needs and problems of young people every day, I would like to see a special subsection entitled "The Party and Young People" in the program, because, if you do not formulate a clear party position on youth policy and do not attract young people to your side, you cannot count on success. Furthermore, I would introduce the necessary specific detail to the subsection "The Party in the Face of the Market Economy." At the moment ideas on these subjects are scattered over all the pages of the draft.

Fifth. Looking at particular aspects, I would just like to dwell on a few. Look, in two cases, the future Union is defined in the draft Program as a federation of sovereign republics, and in a third case as a federation of sovereign states. We must eliminate this discrepancy in the use of a key definition, because this is intolerable in a document of such magnitude.

Furthermore. The first section of the draft states that the CPSU is also a party of values common to all mankind. It would seem that this is good, but what are values common to all mankind? Criteria of values common to all mankind should nevertheless be provided, as well as their relationship with class interests. The age-old dream of working people about socialist justice—although it is a class dream—is also an attribute of values common to all mankind. Is it not from class interests that interests common to all mankind are formed?

A few words about the various trends in the CPSU. In my opinion, they can be divided into two groups according to strategic positions and aims. One group is made up of trends that are in confrontation with the CPSU. You have to address them in the same language as they address us. The other group is made up of the supporters of alternative action within the framework of the CPSU. And I do not see anything terrible in that. All the opinions and drafts advanced by the second group speak of the party's future and a desire to strengthen its authority among the people's masses. As I understand it, the difference is only in the methods and organizational approaches to resolving a common problem. Hence the question that begs to be asked: Should these drafts and opinions be placed in such sharp opposition? Since the final aims are the same, would it not be sensible to base ourselves on this common foundation and reject arrogance and seek to bring the positions closer together in order to elaborate a common program of actions? Such an attitude would be conducive to rallying and strengthening party ranks, overcoming the crisis that is emerging in the party without great losses to its authority among the masses. After all, every Communist understands how

important it is to preserve party unity with the multiparty system that is developing in the country.

The speaker went on to express his opinions on certain other problems in the country's political life. In the first instance, his attitude to the famous appeal of the "nine." In the face of democracy, there is nothing special about the fact that it appeared, the speaker noted. But the fact that it was people from the elite stratum of the party and the state that did this, makes you think. And what, in particular, prevented them from putting their ideas into practice when they were members of the Politburo, presidential advisors, people's deputies, and ministers? Why have they chosen this moment when the situation is starting to be stabilized following the buildup of passions in spring? Why do you necessarily have to come out of the ranks of the CPSU in order to follow a parallel course with it and proclaim the same ideals that were born in the CPSU and are being implemented by it. As you can see, there are many questions. But to all appearances there is only one answer. People who signed the well-known appeal are worried about elementary things, namely saving their own social position.

From the point of view of morals, Boris Yeltsin's presidential decree of the Russian Federation on departyization, which has just been published, can also be assessed in much the same way. All right, you can think that you should leave the party because you want to serve people and not ideas. So be it. But why deprive others of elementary political rights? Today the plenum should give a political assessment of these two facts because objectively speaking both of them are directed against the party.

The political situation in our country is indeed very serious. At the same time, Communists from our republic do not believe that the situation is hopeless or that you should give way to the panic that has taken hold of certain party organizations. I have in mind the appeal to urgently call an extraordinary CPSU congress, the appeal to replace the general secretary, and other appeals.

An extraordinary congress also requires a plan of action. And do we have such a thing? Not at the moment. So a congress would turn into an ordinary talking shop, and would not come up with anything special unless an agreed version of the party program is prepared by the time it opens. Let us wait until the commission's work in this direction is finished, and we will publish the draft, discuss it in party organizations, and among working people. Our republic's Communists, at least, do not feel any acute need to urgently call an extraordinary congress at the moment. There is too much other party work. And our main task is to get out of the crisis in the economy and establish a normal life for people, and first and foremost resolve their problems. Then a material basis will be created for the rational solution of political problems.

Kazakh Party's Anufriyev Says Draft 'Eroded'

PM2907110991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Jul 91 Second Edition p 5

["Account" of speech delivered by V.G. Anufriyev, second secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee, at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on 25 July]

[Text] In my view, the plenum today should answer the following questions: What kind of document do we need today—a CPSU Program or, perhaps, an action program for Communists in the transitional period to a market economy, which will last a short interim period of 2-3 years, say? What will we convene—a congress or a conference? These questions are exceptionally important, they cannot be viewed in isolation from the situation in society and the party.

First the draft CPSU Program. The content of the draft was very much eroded, both because of weakness on theory and because of a deliberate departure from certain fundamental problems including, for instance, whose interests the CPSU expresses, what sociopolitical system it advocates, what attitude it has to the class struggle, and others.

Nor can the level and scale of the generalization of the historical material be deemed satisfactory. There are no pithy assessments from a dialectical standpoint of the road we have traveled. The program provides no direct answer to the question of whether we are living in a socialist society. This can only be surmised by relying on the arguments about the "difficulties socialism is experiencing." For instance, the attitude to the collapse of the socialist system and of many fraternal parties is not expressed at all, even though it is declared that our party will cooperate with communist and socialist parties. And how, in this event, are we to correlate the assertion of the increasingly broad growth of socialist realities with the contradictory processes in the East European countries?

The approach to socialism as a movement and a global process in the world community's development seems cogent, but, given the lack of clarity in the exposition of this complex problem, readers may ask: Whose path is closer to socialism? The path we have chosen or the path chosen by other states?

The reassessment of values and the major shifts in public awareness have led, if not to paralysis, then to an obvious numbing of social research, which has resulted in tangible gaps in the theoretical part of the draft. The presence of "blank spots" in the program's methodology inevitably dictates that it will be a temporary program, which should be stated quite openly.

As the ideological arsenal of a party in the process of renewal, the draft examines the scientific substantiation of socialism, which is developing in line with Marxist traditions and all world communist thinking. One cannot fail to agree with this framing of the issue.

Moreover, it should be stressed that we reject dogmatic approaches toward any theory and the elevation of any ideology to the rank of state ideology. However, the failure to mention Leninism in the Communist Party's program document cannot be explained away as forgetfulness or as the result of tactical considerations on the part of the authors. It should be seen as a position. But, in our view, a position of this kind should be substantiated without fail. Otherwise, it demonstrates theoretical bankruptcy or political cowardice.

In my view, the "Lessons of History" section should provide a detailed and thorough analysis of the reasons which have brought the CPSU to its current, extremely difficult position. I am referring the the treachery of the top echelons of party power during the first years of perestroyka. We have to honestly tell the party and the people that during the time I call perestroyka's "romantic period"—when democratization and glasnost, and people's freedom and liberation were starting to produce tangible results—a group of former Politburo members had already constructed their plan for the CPSU's collapse.

Now to turn to other matters. It is only at first glance that it seems indisputable to call our priority task that of strengthening the soviets as organs of working people's power.

In most Union republics the formation and strengthening of the structures of presidential power, mayors, prefects, and so forth are now under way. The prospects for the parallel existence of soviet and presidential power still seem less than adequately clear. This question needs to be seriously discussed and disclosed.

Furthermore, we are again attempting to play with terms on extremely important issues. Contrary to the draft Union treaty and the Union republics' position, the thesis of the CPSU's support for a "Union of Sovereign Republics" is declared, which will undoubtedly be seen by most Communists and nonparty people as an objection in principle to a union of sovereign states. The draft has been published [proyekt-to opublikovan].

A number of comments should be made on the final section, which is devoted to radical reform of the party. Its weakest point is its lack of any balanced concept of the CPSU's activity under the conditions of a multiparty system and a rule-of-law state, of how to get the party out of crisis, of the disposition of political forces, or of the question of power. Incidentally, a great deal of work has already been done by Union communist parties, so let's bring in everything, including experience of working in opposition.

The CPSU Program should provide a basis for bringing the various platforms within the party closer together and for rallying constructive forces around it. The fate of the CPSU depends on it. In my view, the proposed program hardly carries out this role. We must work, work, and work again on it. I think that we should not adopt a CPSU Program which will be obsolete within a year and lead to rocks being thrown at the party once again. I advocate an action program which will set Communists specific tasks in the period of transition to the market economy and show the entire people our immediate goals, guidelines, methods, and tactics in protecting working people and getting out of the crisis. We must finalize and flesh out the 28th Congress program documents, taking account of the situation, and reaffirm the CPSU's course of engaging in radical democratic transformations, moving to a market economy, and reforming the USSR. We must reaffirm the line of coalition with all forces interested in getting our country out of crisis.

I think that we would gain a great deal if we showed the entire people that our immediate work included tasks such as the stabilization and further development of the mixed economy, the improvement of people's lives on this basis, the ending of interethnic conflicts and bloodshed, the preservation of a unified state, and the conclusion of the new Union Treaty as quickly as possible. This role could be carried out by a party conference which would examine amendments to the CPSU Statutes—particularly as regards the strengthening of internal party discipline and the financial position in the party—and, of course, the principles underlying the formation of the Politburo.

The speaker advocated convening a party conference. However, he said, if the plenum votes for a congress, then it would be necessary without fail to reregister CPSU members before it begins. Although I am profoundly convinced that now is not the time for a congress.

Turkmen Academy's Babayev: Draft 'Base' for Work

PM2907131591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jul 91 Second Edition p 3

["Account" of speech delivered by A.G. Babayev, president of the Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences, at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on 25 July]

[Text] No one doubts that the ruling party, in line with the spirit of the time and the tasks of perestroyka, needs a well-outlined, clear program for the further development of our society.

In order to surmount certain distortions and excesses, for the party to acquire the true nature of a sociopolitical organization, and for all members of the CPSU to join together into an organization of Communist confederates a banner is needed, a banner that everyone understands and holds dear and that unites everyone. The new program under consideration today could and should be just such a banner.

I think that the main merit of the proposed variant is its brevity and readability, if I can say that. If you consider the document from that standpoint, it can undoubtedly be taken as a base, a point of departure for further work. But no more. Why is that? While not aiming to examine

all aspects of the draft, I would just like to point out the main themes enabling me to draw such a categorical conclusion.

First I must say straightaway that if the plenum agrees to adopt the proposed draft as a base in the form in which it is set out, we must agree at once that under the conditions of perestroyka the CPSU is, to all intents and purposes, losing its Communist character and becoming a reformist, social democratic party. In this connection the wording of the party's programmatic aims causes serious doubts. A number of positions here look at the least contradictory and effectively erode the CPSU's communist nature and essence. I am referring to the unconditional recognition of private ownership and hired labor, the structuring of the party on principles of federalism, a Communist's right to be a believer or to hew to atheistic convictions, and so on.

I am surprised by the draft program's lack of fundamental principles governing the organizational structure and activity of the party itself, above all democratic centralism, party comradeship, criticism and self-criticism, party discipline, and so on. If the party really aspires to vanguard positions in society, it must undoubtedly lead working people into the offensive and mobilize them to carry out the tasks of renewal without fail and must instill in the millions of nonparty members a spirit of organization and restraint, a spirit of discipline and systematic development. But for that the party itself must indeed be an organization, an alliance of like-minded people, where the concepts of party discipline and responsibility for one's actions go hand in hand with extensive freedom for a party member.

Hence one of our most important tasks, which must, I think, be enshrined in the new Program, that is, work to revive the CPSU as a sociopolitical organization armed with firm principles and an attractive program.

The situation that has now taken shape requires every Communist to enter into an active struggle for the party and to ensure its lead. We Communists in our republic reckon that everyone, not only the Communists, must fight together to renew the party. There must above all be Communists in those areas where the going is toughest. They must be many times more accountable than anyone else, with absolutely no privileges. Only then will there be genuine respect and a sense of belonging among that mass of people who are still, regrettably, keeping aloof from our movement, but whose support will ultimately prove crucial for our work. I don't know, perhaps all these facts look subjective, but it is on the existence of this standpoint that we are inclined to judge the activity of the Turkmen Communist Party. The republic's Communists have become more exacting, they want to know more than they did before. They want to decide more than was possible hitherto. Profoundly conscious of this, as a scientist and member of the Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee Bureau, I want to point out the cohesion in the actions of the presidential authorities and the Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee.

Now, given Soviet people's increasingly dwindling standard of living, success among the masses will in many respects be determined by the attractiveness of a particular party's economic policy. Consequently, the meaning of the new Program's economic section should, in my opinion, be formulated roughly as follows:

"All the force and energy of the party must be channeled into fighting for the interests of working people, no one must be forgotten or go unheeded by the party. It is the party that should act in the vanguard of the struggle to fully and irreversibly eliminate social inequality—not on the basis of universal leveling, but by developing every member of society, his individuality, and human essence."

If we proclaim that the party will remain committed to socialist choice, it should primarily promote the socialist structure and maintain the civilized forms of enterprise that are developing with the involvement of working people and management, and in property relations.

The Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee has prepared a new program that takes the republic's economic, regional, and national features into consideration. Needless to say, this draft program by no means conflicts with the general CPSU Program, it will even supplement the latter to some extent. There should obviously be a similar position on the question of ownership. It is particularly important here not to copy anyone else's experience and ideas without considering the specific features of each republic individually. It is inadmissible to disregard national features, the level of development of economic relations, and general economic competence.

One of the party's important tasks, in my view, under conditions of established market relations is to formulate a mechanism for the working people's social protection. In its program the party should above all, without glossing over the rough edges, tell people that they face considerable difficulties and show them how Communists intend to overcome these difficulties and how they are seeking a way out of the prevailing difficult situation.

I think that this is a question of fundamental importance. In Turkmenistan alone more than a third of the population is living on the poverty line. A little less than half a million able-bodied citizens are outside the sphere of social production.

But what about pensioners, invalids, large families, particularly in the Central Asian repub ics, single mothers, war and labor veterans, elderly citizens living alone, and so on. The party must endeavor to become a source of hope and support for these categories of people. In short, the CPSU Program must express in a well-defined, clear-cut fashion the idea that Communists intend to firmly uphold the constitutional rights of every inhabitant of the country to labor and guaranteed social protection, and to oppose any actions that restrict their rights.

One of the draft's strategic aims is to build humane democratic socialism—that is not in doubt. But that alone is not enough to ensure that Communists do not say that they do not know in what kind of society they are living and under what system. A well-founded, comprehensible concept for the development of socialism as a whole and humane democratic socialism in particular must be provided. If it has its own particular features. That is all the more important in that a totally contradictory concept is being imposed on society today by all manner of means.

Control Commission's Chuykov: Draft 'Worrying'

PM2907104191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Jul 91 Second Edition p 4

["Account" of speech delivered by V.T. Chuykov, member of the CPSU Central Control Commission and mason at the Poltavskiy Rayon Road Repair and Construction Unit, at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on 25 July]

[Text] The draft submitted for our examination differs profitably from previous versions by dint of one asset—it is short. But many of its provisions are both surprising and worrying, to put it mildly. I will quote: "Communism as a social ideal will always live in people's minds." This reads more like an obituary. One feels like adding "sleep soundly, comrade, you deserve it."

I propose stating that communism is our aim—since we are a party of Communists—and that communism is a science and teaching recognized around the world. We are not just "preserving in our ideological arsenal the scientific substantiation of socialism" but are making it our immediate goal to build socialism and demonstrate just what socialism is.

In section two we need, in my opinion, to describe the nature of the period, not just fragments of our history. We need to state that mankind has entered a special period in its development, when the fruits of reason will either become a means for further progress or prepare the ruin of all life on earth. The worldwide scale of the processes of civilization is the most important feature of the present-day stage. That is a reality. Then the inadequacy of a solely class-based assessment of events will be understood—although classes have not disappeared, just as class contradictions and the class struggle have not disappeared and "peace on earth" has not arrived yet. Incidentally, the passage dealing with the difficulties facing perestroyka should also mention not the black economy—which is now quite open—but state that we have nurtured our own "cherished" comprador bourgeoisie, which will sell off our wealth (already flowing abroad) and buy and sell us into the bargain. It would not be so bad if they were making a profit, but they are selling things for bargain-basement prices in return for rusty Toyotas and brand-name jeans.

The question of power is completely absent from the draft. Previous comrades have mentioned this. What are we? A ruling party or an opposition party? How are we planning to reflect and uphold working people's interests? Where is our place in a multiparty system—in the vanguard or the back seat? These questions need to be clearly answered. We need to say what kind of social base we have. On what kind of law will our state be based? Clearly on bourgeois law, since the soviets only get one mention. But remember that perestroyka began with the slogan "All Power to the Soviets!" The soviets are mentioned alongside local self-administration—this obviously means city councils, municipalities, and prefectures. Yet, if we are talking about people's power—that is, democracy—then of the two forms on offer (the democracy of representation and the democracy of participation) the soviet are the supreme form. They are the democracy of participation. And this needs to be said. Our Constitution does not contravene international legal norms. Indeed, the trouble is that we have a traditional disrespect for the law. And that is why, when writing about the "formation of a rule-of-law state," we should write about fostering respect for the law and, to start with, about ensuring that the law is clearly carried out by all without exception. Otherwise we will not make a success of anything. If you like, to a certain extent we need to force people to be democratic.

Now the economy. If we strip away the camouflage, then we are again talking about private enterprise, privatization, pricing, and, finally, unemployment—the possibility of which is not denied, it is merely suggested that "preventive measures be taken." Perhaps the market economy is a good thing, but the insistence with which people want to impose it on us and the zeal with which people praise its delights and are captivated by the prospect of integration with the world economy reminds me of a Ukrainian tale: "I wished him luck, pushed him in the water, and he was carried ashore by an evil spirit." Well, I don't want to jump into this water, I want to stay on terra firma, I want to be sure of tomorrow. We must not return to the old ways, you cannot jump into the same river twice. But we should not thoughtlessly break with everything that our fathers and forefathers created.

The gist of my proposals is as follows. Most-favored status for producers rather than petty dealers. I was surprised, shall we say, by the fact that agrarian policy had disappeared from the draft program. A pathetic couple of declarative paragraphs with the jarring phrase "priority development of the agro-industrial complex" cannot be considered a serious approach to our biggest problem today. Agricultural specialists have already said that we need to think about who benefits from this overlooking of agrarian policy and the food program.

If we take a close look at the CPSU Program and ditch the packaging, we find bourgeois democracy in the politics, capitalist management in the economics, and the principles of a gentleman's club when it comes to party building. Why are we so driven to measure ourselves by other people's standards! We should create our own standards. Standards that are in line with our

customs and traditions, and take account of our psychology and level of civilization so as not to leave us in an absurd position.

Of course, to use Engels' words, the official program is of less importance than what the party actually does. But, nonetheless, a new program, Engels stresses, always means openly hoisting your banner. That is why the program should in no circumstances be a step backward... The proposed version of it isn't a step backward—it is 10 steps backward. We need urgent and intensive work from the Program Preparatory Commission.

Variant Report of Gidaspov Speech

PM3007120591 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 27 Jul 91 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed report under the rubric "At the CPSU Central Committee Plenum": "Speech by B.V. Gidaspov," first secretary of Leningrad Oblast Party Committee, delivered at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on 25 July]

[Text] Comrades!

The question we are examining today is exceptionally important. In essence, we are talking about the very existence of the Communist Party and our socialist state. We must proceed from these harsh realities of our time.

The events of the past three or four months and the deepening political and organizational vagueness in the party have generated another wave of protests in its lower ranks. They are calling for action by CPSU elective organs and the center, and for a profound theoretical analysis of the processes in society. They are calling for the party program that was promised at the 28th Congress. In the conditions of socioeconomic and political confusion we are obliged to elaborate our own strategy and tactics, inherent to the CPSU alone, which will distinguish us from other democratic movements. And if the submitted draft is examined from this standpoint, it should be bluntly stated that it can only be adopted as a basis only after further work is done on it. We have no objection in principle to virtually all the declared slogans and postulates. But what has this to do with the CPSU Program? It is appropriate in this regard to recall the words of William Pitt, the 18th-century British diplomat, who said of one of the documents of the time: "There is much in it that could be admired but nothing in it with which one could agree."

Our conclusion is that the program comprises a collection of noble goals and wishes for a getter life for the Soviet people to which, one would think, the famous "nine" could easily subscribe.

The goals and the ways to attain them are laid down in such general terms that any actions by the CPSU leadership could be justified afterwards, something that we see being done today.

Compared with the 28th CPSU Congress Resolution "Toward Humane, Democratic Socialism", the current draft takes yet another step—and a very big one—toward the ideological and organizational weakening of the communist movement in the country. We could spend a long time criticizing many of the draft's controversial and vague provisions. For instance, provisions such as the party's attitude to religion, the form of Communists' participation in party organizations' activities, and certain other dubious premises. But cosmetic improvements are not the essence of my point. In order for the submitted draft to become a program, the slogans it contains must be seen in the light of the objective interests of the classes and social groups on which the party plans to rely. We need ideological certitude in the best sense of the word, rather than a deideologized manifesto. We need a scientific and specific approach.

The program should provide answers to the questions of the day and serve as a basis for consolidating all the forces of socialist choice. It does not meet these goals. The party, which is in the grip of an ideological and political crisis, and its millions of members yearning for a revival of their organization are entitled to expect considerably more from the main party document.

Let me dwell on some positions of principle which prevent me as a Communist from accepting the draft in question as my party's program.

First, we can see no philosophical interpretation of our time in it or any specific historical and political analysis of development trends both in society as a whole and in the party itself. Not even an attempt has been made to show what is actually represented today by Marxist theory applied to life's realities. In general, it is not entirely clear which theory we are relying on. If Marxism-Leninism, then what are we rejecting from it as unconfirmed by practice, and what are we espousing? And how are we developing this theory? These questions are totally bypassed by the draft.

One is also confused by the fact that the communist idea is mentioned only once, on page 3, not from the standpoint of a scientific analysis of the phenomenon, but rather in the form of an epitaph.

Second, if the party stakes a claim to preserving its identity, then we must clearly define formulas relating to the main elements of our statehood and social system [zhiznestroitelsvto]. Their infinitely broad interpretation should be made exceedingly specific on the following points.

Above all, the question of ownership. A plurality of forms of ownership is a reality of life, but we need to state our position as regards priorities. Communists' principled position is to recognize the dominant role of the state and collective sectors and the socially oriented, regulated market, which requires state planning of social programs.

As to the question of people's power, a course of destroying the soviets as organs of the people's political power has clearly emerged over the past two years. They are mentioned in passing on one occasion, and then people go on to talk about representation for workers and other sectors of the population in certain "organs of power at all levels."

It is already obvious that the 19th party conference's ideas to the effect that "the main thrust of the democratization of our society and state means the complete restoration of the soviets' role and powers as fully-fledged organs of popular representation" have been totally rejected.

Today the party should act as a united faction in all power structures, clearly upholding its principled views and provisions. For the time being, everything is being done to remove the CPSU from the political arena. Decrees are being promulgated on the departyization of soviets, administrarive organs, public organizations, and labor collectives. And in these conditions the party and the country's leadership deem it possible to keep silent, without declaring their stance. The RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] president's latest decree marks the beginning of a struggle not against party organizations but against people, Communists, and families.

On the question of responsibility for the current crisis in society and the party, the compilers of the draft try once again, as they did in the past, to hide behind the difficult legacy of the past, the crimes of Stalinism, conservatism, the power of inertia, and resistance to change from some anonymous "apparatus." But this is an oft-used formula. And they only allude slightly and impersonally to their own "hesitation," compromise, and delayed radical solutions. If we are claiming to reflect working people's political interests, then we cannot sidestep the question of the mechanism for providing reliable social guarantees and rights for them. But the draft contains general wishes and appeals.

Another fundamental aspect concerns the question of the Union's unity. In our view, the vague stipulation about the multinational state's transformation into a democratic federation of sovereign republics must be given logical clarity. Any ambiguities or innuendos would be dangerous here. It is necessary to determine a single line and arrive at agreed formulations stemming from the results of the 17 March referendum and the Union Treaty's text.

Finally, the activity of the party itself. Here there is an obvious desire to revise its key tenets which were laid down by Lenin. What, for instance, is the meaning of the phrase: "The party shall voluntarily provide material support as far as possible"? The consequences of such a practice are easily foreseen: The party will turn into an amorphous movement, a special-interest club. All this smacks too much of Yuliy Martov's formula of "providing regular personal assistance."

We are hardly going to resume an 88-year-old argument. History has already settled it. How are "deputies elected from the party" supposed to understand the priority of voters' interests over party discipline? In short, these kinds of pseudo-democratic passages do not benefit the program.

We could also mention the weaknesses in the document. But, I fear, the discussion would not be constructive. The situation in the party requires the adoption of a number of fundamental decisions. First, a large-scale Communist Party program should be elaborated. There is no time to waste in this area. Second, at this stage it is necessary to immediately work out a minimum program which will define the CPSU's tactics and strategy for the next few years.

The Leningrad party organization has elaborated complementary draft programs which, in our view, do not suffer from the conceptual shortcomings I have already mentioned. I propose that we should not restrict ourselves to discussing just one draft, but that it should be viewed in the context of the existence of others, including the Leningrad drafts.

A few days ago an enlarged sitting of the Leningrad CPSU Oblast Committee Bureau, generalizing proposals from primary party organizations, city party committees, and rayon party committees, called for the convening of an extraordinary CPSU congress in October or November this year with the agenda:

1) On the Situation in the Country and the CPSU Central Committee's Report.

2) On the CPSU Program and Statutes.

3) Organizational Questions.

Among the latter it would be expedient to examine:

—changes to the composition of the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the Central Committee Secretariat; replenishing the Secretariat, preferably with young CPSU members;

—distribution of functions between the CPSU Central Committee, Politburo, and Secretariat.

Given the state of public opinion, the question would arise at the congress of the expediency of combining the posts of general secretary and USSR president.

In the run-up to the forthcoming congress Leningrad Communists intend to hold a conference and elaborate a clear-cut position on the points raised. We insist that a decision on the date for holding the congress this year be adopted at this CPSU Central Committee plenum.

Thank you for your attention.

Ukraine's Kharchenko: Unity Needed

PM3007121591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
29 Jul 91 Second Edition p 4

["Account" of speech delivered by G.P. Kharchenko, second secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on 25 July]

[Text] It is no coincidence that attention has been focused on the work of today's plenum not only by our party, its results are awaited by our whole country, too. Everyone who holds dear the interests of socialism and the integrity and prosperity of our multinational Soviet state hopes that the CPSU Central Committee will at last undertake real measures to consolidate the party, revive its militancy, and save society from final collapse.

Socialism's opponents, who have already secured many key positions in the state and society, are hoping that our plenum will mark the organizational split of the CPSU. But that would mean nothing less than its final departure from the political scene. That is why to counter these trends it needs the unity of the CPSU Central Committee. Clearly, the Russian President's Decree on eliminating statutory party structures was timed for our congress. Now one cannot help asking: Who will discuss the proposed version of the program for building a humane, democratic socialism, where will it be discussed and how, if the CPSU's backbone—the Russian Communist Party—is effectively forced to go underground? We must urge all Communists in the country to show party solidarity and stand up in defense of Russian Communists' legitimate rights. All 15 million must fight back. After all, this is the signal for the final destruction of the CPSU.

Today when the capitalization of Soviet society is becoming a fact and when in the past six years the state has been brought to collapse, the country has been brought to the brink of civil war, and we are being urged not to panic, Communists and non-party people are asking: What was the true purpose of perestroyka? Were we not consciously brought to this state by those who were in the CPSU leadership but who for their descendants secretly dashed off their own "vision of Marxism" or who cared more for the unity of other states than for their own and who have now deserted, filling the ranks of the renegades and hypocrites, but nevertheless remaining afloat? Why does the general secretary stay silent for so long? some Communists ask at our meeting. And immediately they ask: "Is he not preparing himself by his silence for an alternate position?" We, of course, explain the essence of what is going on. But Communists insistently demand a frank answer to these questions so as to preclude any conjecture.

These are not the intrigues of the "enemies of perestroyka," not the longing of the "conservatives" for the times of stagnation, as the mass media, including PRAVDA, claim in unison. This is the anguish and sincere anxiety of those who devoted their strength to building the party and creating a new society and whose labor, selflessness, and service to the motherland are well known. The statement of the council of secretaries of party organizations of the Kiev combined air detachment, where 570 Communists work, says that the bitter discovery for us rank and file members of who was at the Communist Party's helm and who brought it to crisis is becoming obvious. These are the double dealers, the blabbermouths, and the political splitters. In an address to the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Communists at the Yenakiyevo metallurgical plant ask: Whose interests do you represent today, whom does the party defend, whose trust does it count on, why is it avoiding the struggle? In such a situation, secretaries of more than 1,000 primary party organizations in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast at a recent conference that I attended also demanded the convening of a Communist Party congress. They will not understand us if the Central Committee plenum does not give a political assessment of the action of high-ranking political double dealers. It must be said that this is the general mood in the republic's party organizations. Believing that these demands originate in the offices of "party bureaucrats" is a serious mistake. They come from the very heart of the party masses.

I must say frankly that the position of the CPSU Central Committee and the sometimes simply incomprehensible actions of the center considerably fuel separatist feelings in the Ukraine. Within the party people are increasingly often expressing the fear that we will be surrendered to the national extremists just like the Communists in the countries of Eastern Europe and furthermore will be accused of opposing the perestroyka processes. Some people are moved by the grandiloquent "declarations of the consolidation of healthy forces." But what consolidation can there be if renegades from the CPSU are working toward the unification of all so-called reformers without Communists or, to be precise, against Communists. We will resolutely oppose attempts to split the party and oust it from the political scene and, likewise, the desire of various pseudoreformers to find renegades for themselves in the republic. We shall speak out equally firmly against the appeals from certain members of the Ukrainian Communist Party to leave the CPSU and transform the Ukrainian Communist Party into a social democratic party. It is no coincidence that any actions aimed at undermining the CPSU's ideological and organizational foundations and at unsettling it from within immediately win support from overtly anticommunist parties and movements. They actively seek out ideologically immature party members, including in leading circles, those with a weakness for adulation, those who tend to publicize themselves, and who yield to demagogic appeals. The feelings of national separatism and so-called "sovereign communism" are a particular danger in our conditions.

Sometimes we are accused of being more concerned with the fate of the party than the people. Such a juxtaposition is artificial and harmful. Without a strong and cohesive

communist party is it really conceivable to protect the socialist system and make the country—with all the admitted deformations and excesses—rank alongside the world's major powers, a system which has given the people universal employment, free education, medical services, housing, and so forth? Is it really possible to think seriously about preserving the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics while undermining and destroying its cementing force and supporting structure—the Communist Party?

Not only party members but also many nonparty people are aware that it is only by preserving and strengthening the CPSU that we will be able to avert even greater suffering for the people, defend the country's socialist orientation, defend Soviet power, and preserve the Soviet Union. In this connection great hopes are naturally pinned on the new Program. Communists think that the party is offering society a realistic program for overcoming the crisis and on this basis it will succeed in seizing the political and intellectual initiative and uniting its ranks on a renewed and truly modern ideological and theoretical platform.

The republic's party aktiv is familiar with the draft in question. It should be noted as a positive factor that the draft emphasizes the immediate aims which the CPSU is setting itself. Of course, one can only welcome the authors' desire to create a document which answers the questions of the time and is a basis for the consolidation of Communists.

This task is not easy. Carrying it out involves great difficulties. Unfortunately, it cannot be said that the authors of the Program have fully coped with it. As many comrades are noting, compared with previous versions which the Program Commission has discussed, the present draft is emasculated, to a considerable extent even primitivized, if you will pardon my harshness, and politically omnivorous. By adopting such a program the party essentially will not have a principled ideological and political identity of its own. The document brings together guidelines more akin to the program documents of liberal and social democratic parties than a communist party.

As is well known, the task of any party program designed for a transition from one qualitative state of society to another, is, in the words of V.I. Lenin, to answer the question: "What does this transition actually consist in, from what does it lead and to what, where does it want to go?" I think that comrades will agree that the fundamental cause of the dissatisfaction of the bulk of Communists with the 28th congress Program Statement is indeed that it did not give a precise and convincing answer to the question: What is the humane, democratic, socialist society which the party is urging us to build. And I do not agree with Comrade Grachev, who said that this is not necessary for the party today, it is a secondary question. We do not find such an answer in the present draft. One may go further. The Program actually avoids this problem, confining itself to the statement that "the party is built on the commitment of its members to certain ideological values," that "for us this is the idea of a humane, democratic socialism." This socialism itself is determined in terms that are general, vague, and hard to understand.

The draft stresses in every way the recognition of the diversity and variety of forms of ownership—state and private, joint stock and cooperative—and the free development of collective and private forms. At the same time it does not say that the CPSU will give priority to collective forms of ownership and management. It is noteworthy that the draft's authors did not consider it even necessary to at least mention kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes [state farms]. Ought we avoid spelling out our position on the private ownership of land? There isn't a single word on when the people will have a guaranteed food supply. It should be noted that on the question of ownership as a whole, the draft takes a step backward, even in comparison with the 28th CPSU Congress Program Statement which, as is well known, talked only about private labor ownership.

I would like to say that the greatest dissatisfaction and even anxiety is caused by provisions of the draft relating to the party itself. To be blunt, it should be stated that the document actually provides a guideline for the further softening of the CPSU, an erosion of its organizational foundations, and the undermining of many of the principles ensuring the unity of Communists' actions. Declaring the party's democratization to be the leading criterion of its renewal (with which I am bound to agree), the draft simultaneously envisages a number of provisions which, if fulfilled, will lead to the disintegration of the party and turn it into an amorphous and unviable force. In fact this is a question of the final repudiation of the principle of democratic centralism. Not to mention the fact that the thesis of the non-mandatory nature of direct participation in the work of the party organization, nonpayment of membership dues, and voluntary material support is fraught with the most serious dangers for the party.

One final point. The draft Program does not provide a mechanism for the realization of the goals which the party sets itself. But without that it will just be a declaration of intentions. And it is not clear from the draft whether we will set the task at all of ensuring that party's aims coincide with the state's efforts?

Thus, the draft new Program contributes little new to the assessment of the situation or to the posing of the tasks when compared with the 28th CPSU Congress Program Statement. And clearly it needs further work. The conclusion is this: The draft Program must be thoroughly worked on and radically revised in the light of the discussion at the plenum and only after that should it be published for broad discussion.

Tajikistan's Makhkamov: Draft Creates Opportunity

PM2907104591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Jul 91 Second Edition p 4

["Account" of speech delivered by K.M. Makhkamov, first secretary of the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee and president of the Tajik SSR, at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on 25 July]

[Text] Our party is going through a complex period. The roots of the dramatic situation in it, to use Lenin's words, lie in the change in our entire view of socialism and in the need to radically revise certain organizational and political principles of party activity.

Not all party members are capable of withstanding this break. And this is entirely explicable. The burden of historical responsibility for the fate of the country, the growth of discontent among people at the sharp deterioration in their living standard, the fierce criticism to which Communists are being subjected in the mass media and everyday life, and much else besides are a severe test of the moral and political qualities of both party leaders and the party masses.

The crisis in the party has produced not just a considerable reduction in its ranks, but also the formation of various ideological and political trends within it. Representatives of some of these are calling for a return to our former class positions, essentially referring to the restoration of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Supporters of other trends are striving to reject our entire historic legacy at a stroke and base the party on the social-democratic model of the developed Western countries. This movement has been more and more vocal in the CPSU of late and, in my view, is right to compare the logic of thoughts and actions with the logic of urgent objective changes in society, and to campaign for the achievement of civic harmony and the consistent renewal of the CPSU.

It seems to me that the draft party program which is under discussion reflects the latter approach and creates an opportunity—perhaps the last opportunity—not only to preserve the party but to revive people's faith in it as a generator of social progress.

We will be conveying some private views on the draft program to the Program Commission. In this regard permit me to state my view of those provisions of the document which are prompting the most acute debates in the party and pose the danger of an organizational and political split in the CPSU.

The main question lies in the thesis of the transition to a mixed economy—in which there is no place for forms of ownership with curtailed rights—and of the creation of a mechanism for coordinating various economic structures for the sake of ensuring that the country prospers and that working people's needs are satisfied.

The history of mankind's development shows that attempts to create a single-dimensional [odnomernyy] economy based on just one structure are doomed to fail. This is shown by all our country's past experience. So the transition to a mixed and market economy is dictated by life itself. Admittedly, the means of transition could differ. Unfortunately, the first steps down this road have not always been correct—or, rather, they have sometimes been arbitrary.

In this connection privatization processes have begun wildly, there has been a surge in the "black" market, customs barriers are being erected between the country's administrative and territorial entities, and so forth.

I would emphasize that it is not the actual transition to the market and the market economy that is faulty, but the means of implementing this demand of life. That is why it is important today not so much to declare the idea of a mixed economy as to ease its birth pangs.

If in the near future the market relations now taking shape do not move in a civilized direction, then an even larger number of people will turn their backs on us and the initiator of perestroyka—the CPSU—will finally turn into a political outsider.

And, when it comes to economic transformations, it is fundamentally important to bear in mind the fact that each republic, and sometimes even each individual region of a republic, has its own specific features which cannot be ignored. Tajikistan's Communists advocate the rejection of total state ownership of property. But they oppose hasty and wholesale privatization, which will only increase chaos and produce a social explosion.

I have already mentioned the process of an ideological and political parting of the ways within the party. This is now the gist of the second key problem which must be resolved by the party program. The party is part of society. The political struggle in society is reflected in the CPSU. But there is a trend in society toward the attainment of civic consensus. A vivid example of that is the "nine plus one" agreement and the progress toward signing the Union Treaty. Conversely, there is a growing political split in the party. Loud calls are being made for an extraordinary congress to be convened, for organizational questions to be resolved, and for "leaders who have betrayed the party and the people" to be removed from the leadership.

There is a view that the time has come for all Communists to decide where they stand—whom they support, what platform they back, what trend they espouse. A mechanism for implementing this goal is also proposed—the exchange of party cards, the reregistration of party members, and even hearings where all Communists would have to appear before the organization and state whether they are with us or against us. If we go down this road, political infighting will mean that we will be finally cut off from the people. The like-mindedness we have achieved as a result of struggle would run the risk of merely turning into stagnation again.

My meetings and discussions on the eve of the plenum with Communists representing the republic's working class, peasantry, and intelligentsia convince me that Communists and even people sympathetic to the party expect the CPSU to produce not political shows but practical steps and honest answers to the questions of concern to society. I wholly agree with this view. As for the question of self-determination, for a considerable proportion of the party masses—in Tajikistan, at any rate—it does not arise. I fear that in certain places it is being stirred up artificially. By initiating this idea and imposing it on ordinary Communists, are we not additionally encouraging Communists to leave the party?

Incidentally, I see no particular difference between the political ambitions of some figures in the party and the well known attempts to use administrative methods to remove party organizations from the working people's environment. In both cases these ambitions are nothing but a desire for political diktat. The presence of various ideological trends in the CPSU during this highly difficult period which we are experiencing has naturally left it at fever pitch. But let us not forget that diversity of ideas and the opportunity for open debate are the guarantee of the party organism's constant renewal. That is why it would be correct now not to impose bans on platforms and factions but to find points of contact between them on the most important, fateful questions rather than exacerbating the process of dissension and recrimination.

The next question is the problem of correlating the CPSU's general tasks with the tasks of its national detachments. Realizing that the fate of the party's integrity and unity depends on the elaboration of the program as a general basis, we must also take on board the fact that a unique disposition of political forces has emerged in each republic. One detachment of the party is in opposition, another is operating in coalition with other parties, and yet another is continuing to retain political leadership despite its internal contradictions. Hence the conclusion that we should adopt a document which would be a kind of core or quintessence of our common goals and tasks, supplementing it at republic and other levels with practical action programs. I believe that the draft CPSU program can be seen as a progressive document. It is based on the realities of the day, takes account of historical experience, and is free of the idee fixe of the past that by decree from above all Soviet people must be made happy by a certain date. The positive aspect of the draft is that it makes it possible, on the basis of the features of each region's development, the party organization's political status within it, and consideration of national features and other factors, to carry out and enrich the program, reinforcing it with practical actions.

In conclusion, the speaker proposed taking account of everything valuable expressed at the plenum and publishing the draft program in the very near future. The discussion of the draft should be completed by November or the end of this year with the convening of either an all-Union conference or an extraordinary congress. And the CPSU Program should be adopted at it.

Moscow Worker Nikolayev: No Guarantee in Draft

PM3007083591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jul 91 Second Edition p 4

["Account" of speech delivered by K.A. Nikolayev, foreman of the No. 42 Mechanization Administration of the No. 3 "Mosstroymekhanizatsiya" Trust, at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on 25 July]

[Text] I will say honestly that, while foreseeing many events, I still did not contemplate that we would arrive at such an existence as we have experienced over the past six years. In both the political and the socioeconomic aspect. The foundations of Soviet power have been practically destroyed. The foundations of the new power have been created on a wave of unbridled anticommunism: parliaments, mayoral offices, prefectures. All this has been done in the people's name, albeit without their participation and even contrary to their opinion.

Market relations were proposed to strengthen the economy. This idea was subsequently transformed into the market to which there is no alternative. In the end, there is the law on the reduction of state control and on privatization, in which the rights of a USSR citizen were equated with those of foreign citizens, i.e. corporate bodies able to buy anything they like from us to be their private property. At the same time there are no guarantees for the people's normal existence under conditions of semisocialism, semicapitalism.

The specter of dictatorship is becoming real. The RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] president's decree is the first step toward its manifestation. The question arises: What next, where will the party go, will it wake up or, being in a semisomnolent state and arguing over which platform within the CPSU is the best, will it allow itself to be removed from the political arena finally and irrevocably? Here the Marxist platform stands for the interests of the working people, and primarily of the working class. The so-called democratic trends hardly remember the working class. And now there is a new movement too—for democratic reforms. Only we do not know in whose favor. In any case, not in favor of the working person, since the proposed reforms envisage unemployment and a further drop in living standards.

The draft Program proposes no guarantee for the working class, apart from the usual general phrases about upholding its interests, and without any mechanism for realizing even these vague formulas. At the same time the working class is identified with practically all social sections of society: both with those who participate in producing the product of labor and with those who only use this product without giving working people either spiritual or cultural or any other compensation in return.

At the initial stage of the USSR Supreme Soviet's activity people were irritated by phrasemongering in drawing up laws which have no effect on improving the working people's life. Then these processes were joined by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, the main area of whose activity remains the approval of the position of one grouping of deputies or another. The idea has been suggested to the people that this is all correct and that similar battles take place in all the world's parliaments. I will venture to disagree, for there, in parliaments, they decide questions concerning the life of the country's population, and the results of these decisions can well be perceived on the store counters. And as for whose party or program is better, this is shown by by-elections to parliaments at various levels. At the same time the people retain the right to recall at any moment a parliamentarian who is working badly or who has deceived them. But people in our country tried for almost a year just to recall Zaslavskiy, and again he has been promoted to a so-called mayoral office. All this cannot help but affect working people's sentiments. They no long believe in anyone's promises and have begun uniting in order in this increasingly worsening life to champion their own rights—economic and political. An organized workers movement which sets itself the aim not of overthrowing but of championing Soviet power and its principles and significance is gaining in strength in the country. And this is further confirmation that the principles of capitalism, toward which we are being persistently pushed under the flag of democracy, economic reforms, and the revival of private-ownership capital through so-called enterprise, are alien to the working class and to all working people.

I consider it my duty to report to the plenum that at the 20 July constituent congress of Moscow's workers, which was attended by almost 700 delegates representing approximately 400 Moscow enterprises, very convincing assessments were made of the events taking place in society and of the delegates' attitude toward them.

The question of the attitude of Moscow's workers toward the CPSU was not raised specially at the congress. During the work of the congress, however, this attitude was defined by the delegates' reaction to the proposal by a speaker for the Moscow trade unions not to support the party—a reaction in which trust in the party was expressed clearly and unequivocally. I want to emphasize that Communists made up just one-third of the delegates, but the reaction came from all the delegates, who demanded that the speaker be barred from the floor. At the same time many speeches expressed sincere pain at the bad work of the CPSU Central Committee's elected organs, i.e. the work of you and me. Workers believe that we are yielding one position after another and that we must get down to business. Workers believe, not without grounds, that the CPSU alone can rectify the situation in the country, but what is needed for this is perestroyka both in the party and in its leading organs.

New grievances are starting to be leveled at the party in meetings and conversations in labor collectives, grievances which gladden me. Why? By what right has the party not explained what is happening and what is the cause of this, and why do they let people be confused by political phraseology? The congress of Moscow's workers adopted documents, and I will forward them to the plenum presidium.

At the same time I cannot fail to voice my bewilderment at the work of our party press. PRAVDA did not provide a single line about the workers' congress. RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA provided a few lines in a column, and many other newspapers provided no information. MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA was the sole exception. On the other hand, what we call the "yellow" press provides very tendentious material detracting from the line taken by the workers at the congress. And this in almost all the newspapers which oppose the CPSU.

And the final point. A proposal was made at the congress of Moscow's workers to convene a congress of workers of the Union, which proposal I am conveying to the plenum, and I ask it to support this proposal and to give assistance in organizing and holding a congress of the country's workers. In my view, such a congress must be held before the party forum, i.e. before November 1991.

Tomsk's Pomorov: Action Needed 'Today'

PM3007111591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jul 91 Second Edition p 3

["Account" of speech delivered by A.A. Pomorov, first secretary of Tomsk Party Obkom, at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on 25 July]

[Text] It is not only the question of how a country that is very rich in terms of natural resources and human talent could become so spiritually and materially impoverished that is being raised now in the Union and abroad. The question of whether we, this vast power, can rise up from the ashes is being asked with even greater disquiet. Both questions must be answered at today's plenum, discussing the draft party Program. On these answers depends the fate of the CPSU and, I believe, the country. But for that all structures, all movements must rise above the political hullabaloo and anarchy into which the perestroyka of the political system has ultimately been transformed in order to glimpse the direction of the real streams of social and economic life in the country.

From the vantage point of April 1985 the conclusion is clearly confirmed that the CPSU, the author of perestroyka, considered that the main thing for it was to start the process, but then began to act indecisively and to improvise blindly. The emergent political structures of power joined the struggle for power and in the country there developed a force which is destroying it. The political atmosphere became overrun with new terminology and uncoordinated laws which have so far proved capable only of muddling public opinion and plunging society into chaos, without affecting the main issue.

Abandoned during the transitional period by all structures, the economy followed in the wake of social chaos and, naturally, began to collapse. Political movements and parties, including the CPSU, faced with hostility from one another and the threat of a split and laying down the law on behalf of the people, forgot about the main protagonist in perestroyka—the people. They ceased to take them into consideration, treating them as a pawn.

April once more—this time 1991—constituted a kind of milestone when vast masses of Soviet people crossed the poverty line. Patriotism within political parties and movements gave way to a desire in many respects to grab some prestige and acquire fresh privileges. The quest for a way out of the economic crisis is giving way to a quest to see who brought the country to this dangerous point, beyond which lies the abyss. Everyone is trying to blame the CPSU and win prestige by criticizing it. The people are still uninformed and often even misinformed. Parties and movements have fallen hostage to their leaders' mistakes. Radical extremism and right-wing conservatism may now reduce the country to all-out civil war.

The CPSU has not done enough to defend the ideas of the 28th Congress and is in a number of cases bent on self-destruction. Unformulated cadre policy and party officials' lack of social protection have to a considerable extent deprived the party of professionalism. Something that has been a boon for other countries—combining political and state power—has hitherto failed to produce the desired effect in our country.

The party Central Committee and party committees at local level have ignored theoretical work. In this connection the outlines of perestroyka have begun to grow fuzzy. Antiparty and antiperestroyka forces have begun to act in the name of perestroyka. The party's vast scientific potential has not been concentrated on elaborating its theoretical and ideological foundations and anticommunism has swamped the country. The party is being slack in revealing the sources and tactics of anticommunism. At the same time many of its current inspirers have emerged from the "pressure" system; having savored its sweetness, they are now employing its most sophisticated methods. Having lost themselves in perestroyka, they once again want to consolidate their hold on the top authorities.

The road toward the market that the party has recognized as inevitable and objective is occasionally implemented through slogans, without in-depth study, without formulating mechanisms. Parties and political movements accuse one another of populism or conservatism. A mighty flood of shady operators have cut in here. However, the crux of the matter now is probably the fact that the people must understand the advantage of the market. They cannot understand blips and silences. They have largely remained inert to the market movement, experiencing the limitations and adversities. The policy pursued by the party and the structures of authority, whereby people's lives have deteriorated over a long historical period of time, has been dubbed "political intrigue."

Many leaders are trying to forge fresh prestige out of self-preservation, betraying the party's interests, and add the treacherous poison of destruction to the sweet honey of unification, sinking to political corruption and fresh populism. We must tell people this if we want to be patriots and restore their trust. The party cannot exist without the people's trust.

The answer to the second part of the question is even more important. Will we be able to revive as a renewed party? We can find the answer to this question in the powerful voice of the referendum in favor of retaining the integrity of the USSR. However, even the most inspired program is dead without clear-cut, clear, reliable methods for its implementation. Our present characteristic tactic of advancing along a vague trajectory is no good. So far it has only brought about the collapse of the economy and may go further. Everyone is working for the long-term future, yet people have lost faith in this because state and party structures are not involved in people's daily "routine" lives. The anticrisis program aimed "over the horizon" intensifies the crisis.

People must know what will be done today. The idea that 15-20 percent of everything that regions produce should remain under local jurisdiction has long been bandied about. The authorities are coming back to this, but are employing delaying tactics, thinking that production can be increased by seizing everything. No, first, the hole only grows larger when more is taken out of it. Things are different with the economy. Second, the Siberians back the Russian president, who signed an order on contract prices for 25 percent of the resources extracted here. Third, it is time for all legislative and executive bodies both in the country and the republic to cast aside the shame of unfulfilled promises to agrarian workers as regards the 15 percent of the state budget that they are to be sent, changing prices for industrial output, and organizing production of equipment for individual farmers. We must name the statesmen tasked with doing this, along with those who are bringing the country closer to famine, the specter of which is becoming increasingly apparent with every day that passes.

Fourth, we must be bolder in agreeing to short-term mutually beneficial concessions so as to obtain surefire credit and then enterprises with modern technology. We cannot spend all our time thinking that a production unit can only make major progress by privatizing fixed capital of which 70-90 percent is dilapidated, although this is happening consistently.

So we need a minimum program to cover 18 months or two years to show people how the CPSU sees the immediate move away from impoverishment and hunger. The long-term future alone will not convince

people, will not produce the required surge of confidence and consensus that are so needed to rescue the country and the party.

Certainly, the country can be revived as a renewed, democratic, civilized country and join others in the panhuman order if the anarchic regime is replaced with the opposite kind of regime. I beg you, please do not confuse this with dictatorship. I am talking about a civilized order where adopted decisions are carried out, thieves are convicted, and people walk the streets with no fear of criminals.

People are asking: Why has authority been replaced with all-out presidential power? Is it not to bring Soviet power to its knees? Undoubtedly, it too needs to be reconstructed and improved, made more mobile, responsible, and professional, but we cannot disregard this organ of representative democracy to such an extent.

Members of all kinds of political movements must realize: People believed in democracy, in the need for perestroyka, in the need to keep step with all civilized countries, and in the new thinking, but they will not accept the possibility of continuing to feed the political engine with abuse of ephemeral party officials, creating another privileged apparatus, supplanting their opinion with that of a group of groupings, and squandering their hard-won and recognized, and they will, admittedly, refuse to be burdened with shady dealers and intriguers, with no regard for the change in the constitutional system.

The activity of the party and its leadership, the quest for ways to unite all forces in the country, the role of the presidency, and the future of socialist choice all need to undergo principled discussion within the party. That is why a CPSU Congress must be convened within a rational period. A considerable proportion of Siberian Communists want it to be held in September.

There must be careful, well-conceived preparation for the Congress and the Program above all constitutes the purpose of convening the Congress. But, as has already been pointed out, this must be supplemented by a minimum program, exposure of the tactics of anticommunism, clear delineation of the outlines of perestroyka, theoretical renewal of socialist choice, an indication of the place that our ideology holds within panhuman values, and definition of the main dangers of perestroyka.

A great deal has already been said at the plenum about the party Statutes adopted at the 28th Congress. According to many Communists in Tomsk Oblast, the main lesson to be derived from the work on the Statutes is the fact that the party should not speak at someone else's prompting. The Statutes must be formulated in the interests of the party, not to oblige opposing forces.

Many sections and provisions of the Statutes simply do not work. For instance, the new structure of the Politburo, the severing of vertical ties within the party, and so on. The idea that the onerous period of perestroyka is unending—an idea in common currency—is objectively unacceptable. It has begun to do damage and has become a screen for many structures, justification both for mistakes and inactivity.

Communists are also asking about finally looking into the need for a "strong hand" and "strong authority." This is due to the fact that they have grown extremely sick of anarchy. Let us ponder and see whether we can implement the principles of democratization and the transition to the market, overcome crime and mafia tendencies, and avert an environmental catastrophe amid this chaos, amid such disrespect for the executive and for the laws, given the excesses and lack of patriotism manifested by some mass media and the provocation of bloody clashes. I think that chaos impedes everything.

Weakness and anarchy must not be considered inherent in perestroyka. In that case it negates itself.

The Congress is faced with the tremendous job of discussing the situation within the party and the Program. I think that the main aim of the Program is to unify and mobilize. It is well-known that many people consider the Congress an end in itself. And it is vitally necessary. However, a correct standpoint is also necessary. It cannot be denied that some primary organizations and many Communists are also being accused of inactivity and the lack of a program.

Certainly, Lenin's idea that a political party is doomed without theory is well-known. But the party has a host of work to do as regards the aims of the 28th Congress. Its materials—of exceptional value and geared to the contemporary situation—have not even been read in some areas and have simply been ignored in many places.

Any program lives through actions, that is why the Tomsk Communists intend to use their work on the Program and the preparations for the Congress to select specific actions to realize these aims.

Novgorod's Proskurin: Draft Requires Work

PM2907114191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Jul 91 Second Edition p 5

["Account" of speech delivered by A.P. Proskurin, leader of a leasehold link on the "Druzhba" Sovkhoz, Novgorod Oblast, at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on 25 July]

[Text] One of the main factors prompting me to speak at this plenum is my concern at our party's vague place in society and its virtual dismissal from participation in sociopolitical processes.

You get the impression that the party has been and is being deliberately driven into this situation, otherwise how can we explain the fact that neither the Politburo

nor the general secretary has even once made a principled assessment of the splittist activity of people who until recently determined the CPSU's policy, strategy, and tactics—people who held millions of honest Communists hostage to ill-conceived actions and hasty decisions?

How can we assess—from my standpoint and that of ordinary Communists—the fact that fundamental documents describing the state's policy in the sphere of economic reform, for instance, were adopted without participation or even discussion in a party which considers itself right. How long will we Communists have to put up with being presented with faits accomplis and alienated from the processes taking place in the country? And, moreover, with being blamed for the government's unpopular measures?

I believe that B.N. Yeltsin's decree on the departyization of state structures in Russia was largely the result of central party organs' lack of resolution, sluggishness, and inactivity. As a Central Committee member it is obvious to me that, had we had a strong guiding center, party structures would not have been dealt such a severe and perfidious blow.

You, comrades, should look at how shocked ordinary Communists were by the publication of this decree and how bitterly they are saying that the paralysis in the running of the party is finally driving them to retire completely from the political stage.

We should not leave the plenum without having worked out specific practical measures to neutralize this decree—measures which would make Communists confident that the party is capable of withstanding the anticommunist onslaught.

Not just every day, but every hour since this unconstitutional act was published we have been expecting the general secretary and the country's president to make an assessment of it. But none has been forthcoming. It was only at the plenum today that we heard that the Politburo had examined the matter at its session. Mikhail Sergeyevich, it's awkward for me, as a worker, to remind you of the fundamental difference between your presidential and party activity. We can see that you are doing a great deal as president, particularly on the international scene. But we have been and still are waiting for similarly vigorous action within the party.

We can see and understand the full complexity of the state of our society. We are sure of the need for radical change. Enough has been said about this already. But we will never understand or accept measures which lead to a deterioration in working people's lives. We will not follow politicians who change horses when the going gets tough, deserting their comrades.

The party is part of society. It fully reflects its condition. There is not enough unity in our society today, nor is there in the party. So, in my view, if we fail to set an example of unity, and if, against the background of widespread openness and glasnost, we fail to define as clearly and accessibly as possible our short- and longer-term tasks and the means by which we hope to achieve our aims, then we will finally destroy people's faith in the CPSU and its ability to protect working people. All this should be reflected by our party's new program—which we are nonetheless late in adopting.

In my view, the draft party program in this form is unlikely to be understood or adopted by Communists from different platforms and trends. It undoubtedly requires further work. The draft should contain fewer general arguments, and its stated short-term aims should be clearly fleshed out and backed up by a plan of emergency measures for the party's activity in the prevailing situation.

In this connection permit me to bring to your attention the opinion of participants in a Novgorod Oblast party aktiv meeting held the other day. It expresses concern at the processes taking place in the CPSU, at the increase in factional activity among a number of party members striving to exploit the crisis in the country to satisfy their own ambitions, and at the blow that has been struck against all of society's healthy forces and socialism. The oblast's Communists demand that the participants in the CPSU Central Committee plenum discuss the questions of the state of affairs in the party and the state, and adopt a decision to convene an extraordinary CPSU congress before the year is out. We believe that the congress should hear a report from the Politburo, adopt the new CPSU Program, and provide clear guidelines for Communists and all Soviet people on the party's policy in the prevailing situation, its place and role, and ways out of the crisis.

Moldova's Yeremy: Draft Reflects Tasks

PM2807122591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Jul 91 Second Edition p 3

["Account" of speech delivered by G.I. Yeremey, first secretary of the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee, at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on 25 July]

[Text] It can be said without exaggeration that the present Central Committee plenum is called upon to play a key role in our party's life at this truly dramatic period of its almost 100-year history.

A tremendous responsibility falls upon us—to determine the main outlines of the fundamental party document, the program, and to elaborate a strategic course for the foreseeable future and the longer term.

The present program was adopted by the 27th congress only five years ago. But, let us be blunt, it has proved to be out of touch with life, has been unable to stand the test of time, and has essentially not worked.

We are having to adopt the new program in exceptionally complex conditions. The party has ceased to be a

leading, guiding force. Its prestige has been undermined and, most dangerous of all, there is no unity in the party and internal contradictions are deteriorating.

The situation is exacerbated by the fact that many former leaders who only recently were at the helm of the country's political leadership are today either quitting the CPSU or, while formally remaining within its ranks, taking part in setting up other sociopolitical movements.

Some of them who until recently held key posts in the party and determined its course and cadre policy now perceive the apparatus—which, incidentally, they had a hand in forming—as a conservative force obstructing democratic processes.

In the speaker's opinion, the draft CPSU Program submitted by the commission adequately reflects the objective process of the contemporary development of Soviet society. It correctly formulates the party's strategic tasks.

The document represents an attempt to find the party's place in conditions of an effective multiparty system. It is perfectly obvious that the political parties and social movements that have emerged recently are hoping to tear away part of our party's social base in their own favor. Such is the logic of political struggle.

Today the totalitarian regime has, as it were, switched to total confrontation among parties and movements and a brazen struggle for political power by their leaders. Ultimately only the people suffer as a result of this. In these conditions we should constantly remember that people will back the parties and support the programs that express and reflect their own interests to the maximum extent. And in order to ensure that the program becomes a reliable theoretical basis for practical action, it is very important to bring it as close as possible to the real situation. Of course, you cannot seek in the program prescriptions for the solution of all the questions arising in life, especially according to region. But nevertheless, we are rather puzzled by the unjustifiably equable tone of the draft program, which makes practically the same assessment of the prevailing situation throughout the huge territory of a multinational country. But this is by no means the case; although the pitch of intensity of the sociopolitical situation is everywhere high, which is a reflection of the profound and general crisis, there are regions in which a very real civil war is under way.

Dwelling on events in Moldova, the speaker noted that they are developing in a complex and contradictory fashion. The republic is not taking part in the treaty process, although the Moldavian people want this. A number of new political formations advocate breaking away from the Union. The question of unification with Romania is being pushed. All this is having an extremely negative impact on people's mood and is inciting separatist forces to take actions leading the republic toward a split. The Moldovan Communist Party is taking effective measures to consolidate all forces and to preserve the integrity of the republic and the Communist Party's unity. But we are encountering great difficulties. Even in this situation no clear position on the part of the center is discernible, and you cannot help thinking that Moscow has come to terms with this situation. For instance, it is difficult to tell people why, when the republic was struck by a natural disaster which caused damage of more than 1 billion rubles [R] and loss of life, the center did not even express its condolences. Such points lodge deep in people's memory.

In general you get the impression that relations between the country's president and the republic's leadership have ceased. Yet we need to strengthen mutual links in every possible way. In the prevailing situation the question of agreement among all 15 republics on creating a single economic space is arising in all its magnitude. The draft program dilates on past distortions and errors in the party's activity and criticizes negative phenomena. During the years of perestroyka this theme has generally become predominant, as a result of which the question naturally arises: Is the CPSU a party that notes errors or a party of scientific foresight? It is permissible to ask: Where is the party's intellectual potential, where is the ideological and organizational backup for perestroyka?

The draft insufficiently reflects the present state of our society. It contains no analysis of the reasons for the sharp slump in the economy that has occurred over the years of perestroyka, the decline in the population's living standards, the impoverishment of the countryside, the exacerbation of interethnic relations, or the rampant growth in crime.

No objective assessment is made of the voluntarist experiments which caused tremendous harm to the national economy, such as the antialcohol campaign, for instance. The losses as a result of that campaign exceed R6 billion in our republic alone.

The first secretary of the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee advocated that the draft make a more profound analysis of the present situation within the party itself, which is characterized by an acute struggle between sometimes diametrically opposed approaches toward questions of the strategy and tactics of its activity, mass departures from the CPSU, the creation of parallel structures, the existence of formal factions, and the pursuit by many Communist deputies in elected organs of a policy running counter to the party line and also to the interests of their own voters.

You cannot help seeing that the situation in which certain detachments of the party are operating today is most diverse. Many of its organizations are acting as opposition forces, others are effectively working underground, and yet others are simply falling apart.

This is a situation that the party has not experienced in recent decades. And its goals can be achieved only by fundamentally different forms and methods of work, by discarding those characteristic of a state party operating in comfortable conditions.

The most serious efforts are needed to regain the lost trust of the workers. There can be no doubt that reliance on the working class is the guarantee of the party's political survival and rebirth. Of course, this must not lead to a narrowing of its social base. The party must continue to express the interests of the peasantry and the intelligentsia and all who live on earned income.

Upon the adoption of the new program, G.I. Yeremey proposed starting large-scale, consistent organizational work to strengthen the party's ranks. It is difficult to imagine how someone who does not share the ideas of the party program can remain a member of the party. So it is quite natural that there are increasingly insistent calls for the reregistration of Communists and the issue of new party cards. In these difficult conditions when the party is giving no one any preferential privileges, let everyone determine honestly and frankly whether or not he will remain in its ranks.

I cannot disregard the remarks surrounding the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee either. There is talk about this in a number of oblast party organizations, and also at Moldovan party gorkom [city committee] and raykom [rayon committee] plenums. The increasing difficulties that the party and the country are encountering are for some reason being linked with the name of just one man. But is this a correct approach? Surely this is a throwback to the situation where we saw the leader as the be-all and end-all of everything. I think that no realistic person can question the need for perestroyka and advocate a return to the situation that obtained in our country before April 1985. Yes, you can find many errors and miscalculations on Mikhail Sergeyevich's part, and we openly discuss this in the Politburo, since the conditions for frankness have been created. But at the same time you have to see that many of them stem from the extraordinary nature of the situation. I think it would also be right to ask ourselves: What have we Central Committee members elaborated and constructively proposed? You cannot help thinking that the less we analyze our own activity, the more we like ourselves. We are not entitled to forget that the situation now is totally different. There is no and will be no return to the situation of a state party that worked in conditions of the past.

Today our common task is to improve the party's moral health. In the name of its unity we must jettison petty grievances and ambitions, emotions, and suspicions and at long last get down to constructive work, as the draft new CPSU Program demands.

26 July Speeches

PRAVDA Version of Latsis Speech

PM3007104791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jul 91 Second Edition p 6

["Account" of speech delivered by O.R. Latsis, first deputy chief editor of the journal KOMMUNIST, at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on 26 July]

[Text] Some speakers here relied on extremely arbitrary criteria, using myths dear to their heart rather than real knowledge about various subjects.

Thus, for instance, Comrade Gidaspov even quoted William Pitt. Paraphrasing this really witty saying, I would like to state that such erudition can be admired or even envied, but it can only be agreed with provided it displays an equal knowledge of Marxist literature. Unfortunately, this was not the case. Judge for yourselves. Comrade Gidaspov found a reference to the idea of communism only on page three of the draft, and even then in an insufficiently enthusiastic context, in his view. But this was the historical section. Can we really be downright enthusiastic about the fate of the communist idea in our history? Just recall the promise to build heaven on earth by 1980. It compromised the idea of communism in a way no anticommunist would have dreamed of. It is even more striking that Comrade Gidaspov did not find the idea of communism anywhere else. Yet page 23 reads: "The future lies with a society in which the free development of each individual is a condition of the free development of all." Everyone who has read not just Pitt but Marx and Engels knows that these words come from the "Communist Manifesto" and express the idea of communism in the most scientific and nonvulgarized form. Why is it that, when we encounter the idea of communism in living form but without a label stating what it is, we find it hard to recognize? I do not think that Comrade Gidaspov has failed to read the "Manifesto." Quite the contrary, I am sure. I have a different explanation: In our minds loud pledges of allegiance to the idea are increasingly becoming more important than a real understanding of the idea itself and its real development.

Comrade Prokofyev backed up certain arguments by contrasting development in China and Yugoslavia. I took this reference to mean that Yugoslavia's current troubles stem from its excessive democratism and pluralism. If this is the idea, then it is profoundly mistaken. Everyone who has seriously studied Yugoslavia's development will confirm that it had a one-party system which was no less severe in all respects than the Chinese system. And if the tanks are no longer able to prevent a collapse in Yugoslavia, it is not because of an excess of democracy in the past but because of a shortage of it, and because of the entirely understandable features of that country—above all, its multinational nature.

But the main question is why are all these mythological motives being used? It has been proposed that either we publish the draft solely in the name of the Program Commission—with the Central Committee discussing it for some seemingly unknown reason—or that it be published but treated negatively and not adopted as a basis. I am convinced that the contents of the document must be published—not only for various perfectly justified political reasons which were expressed here, but also for the purpose of an objective assessment—that it should receive a positive assessment from the Central Committee, and that it be deemed expedient to adopt

the draft as a basis for further work. A program in this direction will allow us to be a party of social progress—as Communists are supposed to be—even in the new conditions, which have changed radically since the time when all our previous programs were adopted.

Further work is needed, of course. For instance, it seems to me that the arguments in favor of transition from Lenin's to Martov's organizational basis of the party are unclear. One would like them to be more convincing.

I also agree that at least one paragraph should be devoted to the reasons behind the collapse of the world socialist system, at least to the extent to which this affects our party. I would say here that in East Europe it was not socialism but a distortion of socialism that proved bankrupt. Clearly, it was not genuine socialism. A living organism does not collapse when the hoops holding it up from outside are removed—a living organism has its own backbone. The living basis of socialism had come to the fore and could have grown in these countries, but we ourselves suppressed it with our dogmatism, and finally killed it 21 August 1968. It is hard to imagine anything more preposterous or reactionary for Communists than an attempt to strengthen socialism by using tanks sent in from abroad. That was where the socialist idea was missing.

On the other hand, I think that, despite all the heavy losses, socialism's strategic prospects in these countries have not deteriorated but have actually improved as a result of social development's move from a coercive to a natural basis. One has to have a very primitive understanding of the socialist idea and not believe in its internal strength to think that it has been weakened by the disappearance of regimes such as the Ceausescu, Zhivkov, or Honecker regimes, or to think that they represented the bright future toward which mankind was heading.

It seems to me that, in addition to the discussion, the most important task will be to explain the program. It contains too many new and unusual ideas which, as any social scientist knows, were simply banned from being uttered aloud prior to 1985. And now it is not hard to notice that some comrades fail to comprehend the very language used in the draft, are ignorant of the actual terms used, and have not read contemporary literature on these questions, not even the material published in our party press.

It seems to me that the use of the bogey of social democracy does not promote understanding of our tasks either. I would like to ask: Were Marx and Engels Communists or social democrats? And what was Lenin, when he created our party? And what about us? Has God presented us for evermore with a world workers' movement split into irreconcilable streams? Or should we cherish and nurture this split, and view it as a great achievement rather than an historic tragedy?

It is for historians to decide to what extent this split was caused by the treachery of the Second International's leaders in 1914, to what extent it was caused by the stand some socialists took against the October Revolution, and to what extent it was caused by Stalin's attacking social democrats rather than joining the overall fight against fascism. But today we have no reason to reject any social idea just because it is shared by social democrats. Allow me to present arguments on the essential point—what is bad about this idea—if you are rejecting it.

I think everyone realizes that we are currently discussing not just the draft program—different attitudes to perestroyka can be discerned in every speech. It seems strange: Virtually all speakers have been talking about the same troubles of ours, but their conclusions have been diametrically opposed. In fact there is nothing surprising in this. The entire question, which is at the root of the crisis, is whether perestroyka has been a success or whether it has not yet accomplished very much. In this regard I would like to say a few words about the recent appeal to the people in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA which, unfortunately, nobody apart from Comrade Grachev has seen fit to mention. In the entire text only two words merit attention—or rather two signatures: Varennikov and Gromov. Soviet citizens Varennikov and Gromov or Communists Varennikov and Gromov are entitled to think this way and sign such appeals. But generals holding key positions in the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs should realize that they must resign before signing such appeals. They should realize that they are serving a great power, not a "banana republic" famed for its military coups. The participation of high-ranking military officers in such declarations in no way helps to refute the democratic press' accusations about attempts to turn the Army and law-enforcement organs into a force that can dictate its will to the state and society. How can they be made compatible with the calls to cherish the Army's prestige?

I cannot understand the reaction by some people present here to Grachev's statement on this subject yesterday. Any civilized society has legitimate fears about any politicization of the military. Many progressive politicians have paid dear for underestimating this danger—from Spain of the thirties to Salvador Allende. Our command clearly does not welcome the liberal democratic politicization of the military—the activities of the "Shchit" [Shield] organization, for instance. What about the right-wing radical politicization of certain generals—will they welcome that?

In conclusion, I want to state my attitude to the problems of the party and the multiparty system, which are linked with several past political documents that have been repeatedly mentioned here. So as not to repeat myself, I will be brief: It is in our own interests to overcome as quickly as possible our terror-stricken knee-jerk reaction to everything that is unfamiliar. Shouts instead of convictions in an open debate are a sign of political helplessness rather than strength.

PRAVDA Version of Lukyanov Speech

PM3007102591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jul 91 Second Edition p 6

["Account" of speech delivered by A.I. Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on 26 July]

[Text] We have come to a watershed, a time when each and every one of us, each and every Communist must determine his position. This has been forced upon us by the times, the profound crisis that has embraced practically the whole of society, the decline of trust in the organs of power, and the growth of anticommunist hysteria which has become the legal policy of the state leadership in a number of places.

Completely different paths of development are being imposed on society, and universal denationalization, defederalization, and desovietization are being preached. In a word, the rejection of many, many values that had become firmly embedded in the minds and lives of our people. The watershed that we have reached must map out the way the party will move in the future—whether it will disperse along several channels or whether it will retain its basic main flow.

The draft program being discussed is, in my view, a watershed document. Yes, it is still imcomplete. You cannot fail to note in it a desire to satisfy everyone, a desire to preserve party unity at any price. Yes, the draft requires further work. But the necessary base is there all the same. It allows us to make a choice, to determine our position on all fronts, and primarily to answer the main questions—the question of whose party we are. The party of working people, workers, peasants, the intelligentsia, or, as has been said quite recently, the party of all the people, including the rapidly growing tribe of entrepreneurs and shadow economy dealers. To answer the question of whether we are striving for renewed socialism, a system of social justice and social protection for the working people, or whether we are swinging toward a society in which there can be no room for socialism. As we move toward a mixed economy, we must answer the question of whether we will retain our positions of priority to public forms of ownership, or whether private ownership is given priority. In choosing market economy, we must state clearly whether the market is the end or just the means to achieve prosperity for people. And indeed what should the transition to the market be like—rampant and uncontrolled or regulated and managed? We must answer firmly and clearly the question of how we perceive our country in the future: As a Union state, a renewed federation of sovereign republics with equal rights, or an amorphous confederative union of states with different laws, banks, customs, and hundreds of thousands of refugees.

If we answer these questions clearly, if we resolutely unite on the basis of clear positions, excluding of course "communist fundamentalism" and every kind of regression, people will understand us, the masses will follow the party, and no one will believe those who try to push us in a completely different direction under the guise of liberal-democratic phraseology. I am speaking about this because recently, and in the three months since the April plenum in particular, our party's opponents are doing all they can to prove that the CPSU has exhausted itself and has become a conservative force, in order to instill in people the idea that our party and democracy are two incompatible concepts.

This is most obvious in their policy with respect to the soviets. And it is a great shame that the problem of the party and the soviets was hardly broached at all in the report. As you may recall, the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies was held beneath the slogan of sovereignty to the soviets. The "radicals" went to the elections with it, demanding a transition of power from the party committees to the soviets. But only one-and-a-half years have gone by and the policy has changed sharply. What has happened?

Take local soviets for example. Having squeezed the party organs out of the entire chain of power structures, the politicians of the "new wave" have demonstrated their astonishing inability to either govern or resolve problems that are vitally important to people. Attempts to turn the local soviets into some kind of legislative and executive organs have not been successful either. Many soviets have not lived up to expectations against the background of the big promises made. But they had to somehow answer for the betrayed hopes of the people. And then a thesis emerged about the bankruptcy of the soviet representative system in general, that it should be replaced by Western models of a parliamentary or municipal system, and as you know, this process has already started. Why? And with what aim?

One of the aims was to remove the resolution of practical issues relating to the transition to the market economy, and destatization and privatization in the first instance, from the control of representative organs. To create a tough system of carrying out orders from above. And this means that under the guise of strengthening executive power, what is starting one way or another is the virtual alienation of soviets and their deputies from the resolution of urgent issues of state-wide and local life. At the same time hands are being untied in order to increase pressure on the CPSU and Union organs, on the Army, and the structures of state security and internal affairs. Incidentally, the word "Soviet" has already been removed from the name of eight republics and five former autonomous formations. In certain republics the presidents have gained the right to dissolve not just local soviets, but also supreme soviets. And look at the Congress of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet. Today we can see the methodical way new political leaders and the opposition in general are attacking the supreme organs of the country's state power.

They want to immediately dissolve the Union parliament as an excessively conservative and ineffective

organ. At the same time, they are naturally keeping silent about the fact that it was this very organ that adopted the main laws on moving toward the market, on entrepreneurship, on the social protection of citizens, and that it was the Supreme Soviet that developed democracy and, with new laws, guaranteed national equal rights, man's right to form associations, to free speech, freedom of thought, and freedom of movement, and that it was the Supreme Soviet that stated the need to end the war in Afghanistan.

However, our critics do not care about these facts. Their logic is simple. If some proposals made by the radicals do not get through, this means that there is no point in defending them according to the rules of pluralism. You have to immediately demand the dissolution of the Union parliament, and now even of certain republic parliaments. It would be interesting to hear the noise that our impressionable "independent" press would make if Communists behaved like that!

But let us think more deeply, comrades. What would the immediate unlawful dissolution of the congress and the USSR Supreme Soviet mean now? It would mean one thing—the loss of the only constitutional structures in which at the moment all 15 Union republics and other national-state formations are still represented—structures which embody nationwide interests, and the Union's integrity and its international duties.

Believe me, I am by no means delighted with the work of the Supreme Soviet and my own work in it. But objectivity requires me to I say that it has been and still is one of the most important instruments in the stabilization of the situation in society, a stabilization that sticks in the throats of a large number of our political opponents. So it is no accident that they have recently been stepping up their attempts to drive a wedge between the Supreme Soviet and the country's president. Let me note that a very dangerous wedge is being driven between the general secretary of the Central Committee and the party as a whole. Last Tuesday, for example, none other but the mayor of Leningrad, speaking in Rome, stated that expelling [isklyucheniye] Gorbachev from the party altogether would be an ideal option for our plenum. It is known that such opinions are being voiced not just from the left, so to speak, but they are also coming from the right. But let us ask ourselves the following question bluntly: What would it mean for the party to lose the president today and what would it mean for the president to lose the party? Given the current realities, I am deeply convinced that for President Gorbachev losing the party would mean being deprived of the most substantial support in society, a support based on the masses, with all the ensuing consequences.

As for the party, losing the president would mean losing a key position in the state leadership, but not only that. It would mean immediately giving the opposition, including the forces that are already wielding power, an opportunity to unleash not just persecution, but a virtual pogrom on party organizations. Hence the conclusion that the party must not lose the president, nor must the president lose his party.

In general I believe that the formulas in the draft program about questions of the state, the law and administration, and the functioning of soviets, should be far tougher and more specific. They should take into account traditions, the realities of life, and the need to improve the system of soviets, primarily as a system representing the working people.

Undoubtedly the practical test of this policy will be the forthcoming election campaign, as a result of which soviets at all levels will be formed. It is already clear today that Communists will have to defend their representatives at the elections in a very tough fight.

That is why the CPSU Central Committee must approach these issues in a very responsible way right now. Perhaps by devoting a special plenum to them.

Work in the territorial okrugs will be the most acute problem, as will be the skill to find allies and to really act as the party of civic accord.

Soviet people must soon perceive that the party is in fact getting down to putting an end to the decline of working people's living standard and establishing the strictest social order, that it will not allow our Union to disintegrate. And for all this to be done, we need a united, well organized, and purposeful party.

Economics Institute's Martynov Supports Draft

PM3007102691 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jul 91 Second Edition p 5

["Account" of speech delivered by V.A. Martynov, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economics and International Relations, at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on 26 July]

[Text] I would like to begin by saying that I support the document that has been submitted, and I believe that after some further work it should be published for discussion in the party, in the name of the party Central Committee and the Program Commission. Naturally, by its very nature this document is more of a program statement by the party of its intentions and objectives in this crucial transitional period. This statement is aimed first and foremost at consolidating all democratic and reformist forces both within the country and outside it. I emphasize this because it seems to me to be extremely important that the party cooperate with all forces, not only within itself. And I therefore believe that the criticism we have heard of the "nine" who have now come out in favor of reforms is premature—let us see what kind of a movement it is. And if it is a broad movement which, as I am aware, now has the support of the broad mass of the intelligentsia, let us cooperate with it, whoever may be within its ranks.

The proposed Program is, of course, democratic. But are we not now living through a period of formation and development of democracy? Of course. And the point is that this democracy should ensure the state restructuring of our country, it should be democracy within the law and based on the law.

True, the proposed Program is reformist. But are we not now facing a need for major reforms, especially in the economic sphere? Radical reforms! Now the times and the situation are pressing. And therefore, if we can implement these reforms in the working people's interests—that is the point—then let us not argue about what kind of reforms they are to be. Even if they resemble social democratic models. If they succeed, thank God for that!

True, this is a Program aimed at nationwide progress. That motif should be emphasized, because without that kind of progress, based primarily on the achievements of the modern scientific and technical revolution, it will be impossible for us to resolve any economic or social problems.

The document needs further work, of course. And I think that the fact that it has been presented in such a short form is a good thing, but there are certain shortcomings here. We should think about publishing the variants that were prepared earlier.

It is also expedient to do further work on the Program on two points: first, to formulate more clearly and incisively the question of the need to implement radical economic reforms in the country, and, second, to clarify the content of political thinking in the light of the present-day example of socialism in the development of world civilization.

The need for radical reforms is dictated primarily by the acute economic situation in which we find ourselves. The revolution from above has long since received the support of the masses. And I think the mistake of the perestroyka period is not that we started implementing these reforms quickly. No, the mistake is that we delayed in implementing radical reforms, we wasted time, and that is now having extremely painful effects. And I think that as we begin radical reforms we should state honestly that their implementation is very painful. The market is a very difficult thing. It means ruin for the weak and prosperity for the strong. It means unemployment and structural changes. To paraphrase Churchill, you could say that this is not the best of all possible worlds, but it is the best that has yet been invented in the sphere of economic relations.